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ABSTRACT
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MIDDLE
EAST AND TURKEY’S SECURITY CONCERNS
Çağlar, Barış
Master’s Thesis, Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu
September 2001
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has always constituted a threat to
international peace. International public concern about proliferation of unconventional
weapons has rapidly increased since the end of the Cold War. This thesis analyzes the
weapons of mass destruction threat against Turkey and its dimensions. It starts with the
definition of the concept of threat and the characteristics of weapons of mass destruction.
In assessing the threat, deterrence theory is applied. As the theory entails, capabilities and
the intentions of possible adversaries are studied. Chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Israel are examined in detail to figure out whether Turkey confronts weapons of mass
destruction threat exposure from its neighbors. Alongside the present procurement efforts
of the states as the focal point of the study, past attempts to proliferate and the illegal
transfers of weapons technology, equipment and leakage of fissile material are presented
so as to shed light on the dimensions of the mass destruction threat.
Key Words: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Deterrence, Threat
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ÖZET
ORTADOĞU’DA KİTLE İMHA SİLAHLARININ YAYILMASI VE
TÜRKİYE’NİN GÜVENLİK ENDİŞELERİ
Çağlar, Barış
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler
Tez Yöneticisi: Y. Doç. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu
Eylül 2001
Kitle imha silahlarının çoğalması her zaman için uluslararası güvenliğe bir
tehdit oluşturmuştur. Soğuk savaşın bitimiyle konvansiyonel olmayan silahlara
duyulan uluslararası ilgi hızla artmıştır. Tehdit kavramı ve kitle imha silahlarının
özellikleri ile başlayan bu tez, Türkiye’ye yönelik kitle imha silahları tehdidini ve
boyutlarını çözümlemeye çalışmaktadır. Tehdit değerlendirmesi caydırıcılık teorisi
temelinde yapılmıştır. Türkiye’nin komşularından gelen bir kitle imha silahı
tehdidiyle karşı karşıya olup olmadığını belirleyebilmek için, İran, Irak, Suriye,
Mısır, Suudi Arabistan ve İsrail’in kimyasal, biyolojik, radyolojik, nükleer ve
balistik füze kapasiteleri detaylı bir biçimde incelenmiştir. Tezin özünü oluşturan
halihazırdaki silah edinme çabalarının incelenmesinin yanısıra, bu devletlerin
geçmişteki silahlanma çabaları, silah teknolojileri ve ekipmanlarının transferleri ve
nükleer madde sızıntısı da sergilenmeye çalışılmıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kitle İmha Silahları, Caydırma, Tehdit
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Even in the depths of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union had 
one interest in common: nonproliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear weapons (CBRN), and of their basic delivery means, namely ballistic missiles. 
During the Cold War, states tested their ability to acquire them. International public 
concern about proliferation of unconventional weapons has rapidly increased since the 
end of the Cold War. The former Soviet Union territory is now a troubling potential 
source for leakage of CBRN capabilities, and a new black market may further enable 
states to acquire unconventional weapons. The Soviet Collapse left unsecured bomb-
grade materials in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and Belarus on 
whose territory nuclear weapons were deployed. The fear that smugglers might turn these 
countries into a global black market is high on the agenda. Documented cases of nuclear 
leakage give substance to this fear. Along with nuclear proliferation, the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles, biological and chemical weapons is a major threat to international 
order. Incentives of a number of states to pursue CBRN capabilities are a combination of 
political, military and economic objectives, and nuclear ‘proliferation’ is not a ‘disease’ 
as put forward by the “rogue states” rhetoric. Nuclear proliferation is much more a 
symptom of the struggle for power that characterizes international relations with or 
without superpower conflict. Regional or international rivalries enforce states to attempt 
to protect their core national interests. The fundamental military utility of CBRN 
capabilities are two fold: First, deterrence through the threat of use of them (CBRN 
weapons and ballistic missiles increase the risk that a country will be deterred from 
threatening or beginning armed hostilities against an adversary), and, secondly, the 
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potential to radically change the conduct of war through actual use. Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear explosive tests in May 1998 and self-proclamations that they had become nuclear 
weapon powers can give justification to other proliferants such as Iraq and Iran. Many of 
the countries that are of proliferation concern are adjacent or in a close proximity to 
Turkey. This thesis aims to assess the dimensions of WMD threat posed on Turkey. It 
examines six countries: Iraq, Iran, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel. These states are 
important for Turkey owing to their geographical proximity, capability and rhetoric. As 
for Turkey, generals of the Turkish Air Forces and diplomats from the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry point out that Turkey does not have any state intention to pursue CBRN 
capabilities because they count on Turkish military’s significant conventional power both 
in terms of man-power and technological sophistication. Turkey is also a faithful party to 
several international treaties. Turkey is a state party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT). It ratified it on 4/17/80.  It signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) on 9/24/96, and ratified it on 16th February 2000. It ratified the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) on 5/12/97. Turkey ratified the Biological and Toxin 
Weapon Convention (BTWC) on 11/5/74. It does not have any of the CBRN capabilities, 
and any intention to acquire either. 
The thesis presents data available from public sources. Precise assessment of a 
state’s capabilities is difficult because weapons of mass destruction programs remain 
secret and cannot be verified independently. The thesis comprises three chapters. The 
first chapter starts with the definitions of weapons of mass destruction. It explains their 
characteristics, effects, lethality, differences from each other, and countermeasures if 
possible. Appendixes are provided for further information on the details of WMD. 
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Second chapter is a presentation of the capabilities of neighboring states to Turkey. It 
examines, in detail, the nuclear, chemical biological and missile procurement efforts of 
Iraq, Iran, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. It focuses particularly on present 
procurement endeavors, weapons transfers to figure out the dimension of the WMD 
threat exposure. It also tries to analyze their past efforts to give a picture of the 
foundation laid for developing such weapons. Third chapter reviews the current state of 
relations between Turkey and its neighbors together with their statements regarding 
WMD. While second chapter portrays ‘capabilities’, third chapter tries to present the 
intentions of the states concerned.  
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CHAPTER I 
DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF THREAT AND 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION 
The dictionary meaning of threat is an expression of an intention to hurt, punish, 
and cause pain especially when one’s instructions are not obeyed.1 
 As for world politics, perceived threats to core values of a given society can be 
deduced from distinct signs of hostile intent on the part of potential adversaries, from 
their capabilities or from some state of the international environment suggesting that 
future developments may endanger those core values.2 
 
The concept of national threat perception denotes the perception of fundamental 
challenges to a given national society, to its survival as an independent political entity. 
Threat, then, denotes perceived challenges to core values and organizing principles that 
determine the role and functions of established institutions, of ruling elites and their 
power position. It may also include, in a further conceptualization, challenges related to 
political, economic and other interests that do not necessarily affect the essential feature 
of a given political system. 
Manipulation of the opponent’s threat perceptions is parcel of contemporary 
                                                 
1 Paul Procter, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, Great Britain: Longman Group Ltd., 1978 
2 Sverre Lodgaard and Karl Birnbaum, Overcoming Threats to Europe: A New Deal for Confidence and 
Security, pp.39-46. 
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international relations and of the deterrence theory. Official threat assessments are one of 
the methods among many used to conduct manipulation. Official threat assessments of 
any state can be related to different types of challenges to which the security of any state 
is exposed. Three challenges can be specified: First, capabilities of potential opponents, 
their size, structure and the state of military readiness. Second, political designs of 
potential opponents or enemies. Third, instabilities and uncertainties of the international 
fora, and related difficulties in foreseeing and managing emerging crises. These 
challenges constitute the main elements of national threat assessments. All of them have 
been present in the calculations of governments, but their degree of relevance may differ 
from country to country and over time.3  
The first element, namely capabilities, speaks for itself. The second one, that is 
political designs of potential opponents need to be clarified. Deterrence theory is made up 
of three main pillars: the capability of any given state, the political will of that state, and 
good communication of the message from one to another state. Policy-makers are 
concerned with the political designs of potential opponents. They do need to understand 
their intentions or will. They can only realize that through observing their behaviors and 
declared intentions. However, it is not rare cases where declarations, official threat 
assessments do not match the correlating behavior. 
As for the third element, uncertainties rose to a high level when compared to the 
bipolar world of the Cold War. The superpowers as the cores could use a sort of checks 
and balances system in their dealings with their respective subordinates or peripheries. 
The demise of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe in 1989 marking the end 
of the Cold War resulted in an uncertainty in the Middle East. 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
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Turning again to the second element, namely official threat assessments, 
statements play an important role in not only understanding opponents’ intentions, but in 
manipulating opponents’ threat perceptions as well. Barry Buzan differentiates structural 
threats from intentional threats.4 Intentional ones are those implemented through 
manipulation and deterrence, and may be military or political threats as instruments of 
safeguarding vital national security interests. Structural threats are caused by means of 
conflicting organizing principles of national societies in a context where one another 
cannot simply ignore each other, especially, because of geographical proximity.  
In both types of threats, namely intentional and structural threats, deterrence and 
reassurance are used hand in hand. Regarding intentional threats, the scope for mutual 
reassurance is likely to be greater, because perceived challenges result from consciously 
adopted political and military postures, rather than from the inherent characteristics of 
national societies or of diametrically opposed socio-political systems as in the case of 
structural threat formation. As for the Middle East region, Turkish diplomats and high 
military officials say they do not fear premeditated attack.5 They do not think the other 
side wants war, nor do they believe there is any immediate danger of war. However, this 
is due to the strength of their own military defenses, not necessarily because of the 
peaceful intent of the sides. Thus, Turkey would not like to depend on the good will of 
                                                 
4Barry Buzan, People, States and Fears, the National Security Problem in International Relations, Hemel 
Hempstead : Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991,pp.78-83; For instance, Iran and Turkey constitute such threats 
against each other mutually. The two societies have different inherent characteristics and diametrically 
opposed socio-political systems paving the way to formation of a structural threat for both. Robins 
maintains that Tehran is ideologically in conflict with the Kemalist philosophies of the Turkish regime. 
This ideological conflict is what Buzan calls 'a structural threat'. Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle 
East, London: Pinter Publishers, 1991, p.58. Also please see Süha Bölükbaşı, "Turkey copes with 
revolutionary Iran", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol.13, no.1-2, Fall/Winter 1989, 
pp.92-97. 
5 Interviews with senior officers of Turkish Air Forces and diplomats from Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs who wished to remain anonymous. 
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other states: all Turkish officers stress the need for an effective military deterrence and 
defense.  
Once the threat is conceptualized, we can figure out what poses a threat. Weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) constitute the means with which potential adversaries can try 
to intimidate Turkey. Intentional threats occur through consciously adopted military 
postures. WMD is a keystone technology that affects military postures. Thus, WMD play 
a significant role in the military threat formations. The next step is to determine at what 
magnitude this threat in question may affect Turkey. Hence, dimension stands for the 
degree or magnitude of a threat posed, the range and number of the WMD capabilities 
perceived. 
 
1.1 Conceptualization of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and CBRN refer to a technology and 
weapons system. The shorthands WMD and CBRN are used interchangeably though 
there is a slight difference between the two which point to different categorizations of 
unconventional weapons. The term CBRN stands for chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear weapons, whereas WMD denotes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
and their most commonly used means of delivery, namely ballistic missiles. For reasons 
of clarity and precision, it is better to use the term CBRN in preference to the more 
commonly used, yet potentially misleading term WMD. It is misleading because WMD 
labels chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons under the same banner as if they were 
similar. With the exception of nuclear weapons, none of the unconventional weapons by 
itself is, in fact, capable of wreaking mass destruction, at least not in structural terms. For 
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instance, although weaponized biological agents are often described as “weapons of mass 
destruction”, it does not follow that the ability to inflict mass casualties is an intrinsic 
property. There are key variables in determining the impact of a biological attack such as 
the quantity of agent employed, the means of dissemination, temperature and the speed 
and the direction of wind. Nevertheless, for practical purposes this study will use the term 
WMD. 
The NLD (Nunn – Lugar – Domenici) Act of US6 defines a “weapon of 
destruction” as “any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause 
death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, 
dissemination, or impact of a) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors, b) a 
disease organism, c) radiation or radioactivity”. Most of the definitions of WMD also 
include their most advanced delivery system, ballistic missiles.  A ballistic missile is a 
fast flying rocket that temporarily leaves the earth’s atmosphere while flying from the 
launch point to the missile’s target. The reason why they are included in the WMD 
definition is that compared to every other system, especially aircraft, ballistic missiles are 
an extremely inefficient delivery system for conventional high-explosive warheads owing 
to the great expense incurred for each kilogram of payload delivered. For instance, Iraq 
                                                 
6 Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a foundation 
committed to reducing the global threat of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Nunn served in 
the US Senate from 1972 to 1996. Prior to his service in the Senate, he served in the Georgia State House 
of Representatives. His legislative achievements include the landmark Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act, and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, also known as the Nunn-Lugar 
program, which provides incentives for the former Soviet republics to dismantle and safely handle their 
nuclear arsenals. Senators Nunn and Richard Lugar were nominated for the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize for 
their work in conceiving, legislating and sustaining this important program. In addition to his work with 
NTI, Senator Nunn has continued his service in the public policy arena as a distinguished professor in the 
Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech, as chairman of the board of the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The purpose of NLD (Nunn – Lugar – Domenici) 
Act of US-Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996- is to address the US's critical lack 
of preparedness for what is arguably the most serious threat to its national security: the proliferation of 
 9
used conventionally armed Scud missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, but these attacks 
were largely ineffective in a strict military sense. It is thus appropriate to conceive the 
ballistic missile threat principally as a high-velocity almost indefensible WMD delivery 
system. 
Unless they carry a nuclear, biological or chemical warhead, ballistic missiles are 
not weapons of mass destruction. They are just one of the delivery systems without which 
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warheads deployed on are not WMD. Still, it is 
a fallacy to equate the WMD threat with the threat of ballistic missile attack.7 Because 
WMD can be delivered to a target by multiple means many of which are more accessible 
and less costly than ballistic missiles.  
1.2 Characteristics of Nuclear Weapons 
Nuclear weapons release vast amounts of energy by splitting the atoms of highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. A nuclear weapon can be described as a device in 
which most or all of the explosive energy is derived from fission, fusion or both. What is 
a nuclear fission? It is the splitting of the nucleus of an atom into two or more parts. HEU 
and plutonium when bombarded by neutrons, will release energy and emit additional 
neutrons while splitting into lighter atoms. Explosive energy is derived through this 
process, or through fusion where light isotopes of hydrogen usually deterium and tritium 
join at high temperatures and release energy and neutrons. The HEU bomb-the first 
atomic bomb- was first used against the Japanese city of Hiroshima in 1945 causing an 
explosion equivalent to more than 16,000 kilotons of TNT and killed over 100,000 
                                                                                                                                                 
weapons of mass destruction; First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel 
to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving WMD, Ebscohost-Online Database. 
7 Richard Falkenrath, “ Weapons Of Mass Reaction-Rogue States and Weapons of Mass Destruction” in 
Harvard International Review, Summer 2000, pp.52-54 
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people. There are also more advanced weapons, thermonuclear weapons in which a 
primary fission nuclear explosion triggers a secondary fusion explosion. It can cause 
explosions approximately a hundred times larger than the Hiroshima bomb8. 
Thus, a nuclear weapon is a collective term used both for atomic weapons and 
hydrogen bombs. They are weapons based on a nuclear explosion, whether it is fission or 
a fusion weapon. Eight states are known to possess nuclear weapons capabilities: The 
U.K., China, Russian Federation, the U.S., France, India, Pakistan and Israel. Some are 
believed to be seeking to acquire nuclear capability: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North 
Korea. Of those Israel, India and Pakistan are de facto nuclear powers. They are not party 
to the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), but still have nuclear weapons9. 
Today, the destructive power of nuclear weapons is very well understood. If a 1-
megaton thermonuclear warhead exploded at optimum altitude over a large city, little 
would be left standing or alive within five miles10. Along with the blast and radiation, a 
firestorm could be ignited, burning everything while extending the range of destruction. 
The lethal radioactivity/fallout effect after the explosion could cover a very large region. 
The crucial point that gives nuclear weapons its superiority over CBW is that their kill 
expectancy can be accurately predicted or calculated, whereas no military official can be 
sure of the military effectiveness of CBW or their probability to succeed in achieving the 
                                                 
8 Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation-A Guide in Maps and Charts, 
1998, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1998. 
9 The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty that entered into force in 1970 divides the countries of the world into two 
categories, “nuclear-weapon states” and “non-nuclear weapon states.” It defines “nuclear-weapon states” as countries 
that detonated a nuclear explosion before January 1, 1967, namely the United States (first detonation in 1945) the 
Soviet Union (1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). Russia succeeded to the Soviet Union’s 
status as a nuclear-weapon state under the treaty in 1992. Although India, Pakistan and Israel are among the principal 
states of proliferation concern and each has nuclear installations, they are not party to the NPT. 
10 Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, “Dismantling the Concept of ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’,” in Arms 
Control Today, April 1998, p.1. 
 11
desired end11. Successful defenses against nuclear weapons are extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for two basic reasons: First, they have incredible destructiveness just of a 
single nuclear explosion, and secondly there are numerous ways to deliver them making 
it very hard to defend against. During World War II, British air defenses succeeded in 
shooting down approximately 1 in 10 attacking aircraft carrying conventional bombs. 
This reduced the damage after flying 10 sorties, and London stood, though it was badly 
battered12. Air defenses did a job although minimal. It is not the case for the aircrafts 
carrying unconventional bombs since just one successful delivery is enough for 
annihilation. Thus, a standard, which a defense against nuclear weapons has to meet, 
must be greatly higher than that required for conventional military exchanges, and in a 
situation where just one of them is fatal; such a standard is very hard to meet. Moreover, 
if the offensive weapons-defensive weapons debate is taken into consideration, it is clear 
that there is an action-reaction dynamics between defense and offense. In a war 
environment where delivery means are multiple for an attacker, it is always easier for the 
attacker to bypass the defenses by changing the means of delivery or deploying counter 
measures or maneuvering vehicles or deploying multiple vehicles. When it is possible to 
shift among the delivery options, defense options will always be expensive than the cost 
of the offense still leaving the defender vulnerable. Technology is the impetus for arms 
races and weapon systems and capabilities, thereby also shaping the pace of arms control. 
Up to our day, technological advances benefited the offense side of the war equation, and 
                                                 
11 James J. Wirtz, “Counter proliferation, Conventional Counterforce and Nuclear War”, in Eric Herring 
(ed.) Preventing the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Great Britain: Anthony Rowe Ltd., 2000, pp.6-
13. 
12 Panofsky, op. cit. p.4 
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while this is the case nuclear weapons continue to be the most desired weapon13. 
Nuclear weapons can be deployed in the form of land or sea-based ballistic and 
cruise missiles of various ranges, artillery shells and aircraft. Nuclear explosives have 
been weaponized into atomic demolition munitions, anti-submarine weapons, earth 
penetrators, and air and missile defenses14. Furthermore, short-range missiles fired from 
nearby ships, giving such missiles a strategic value, can also deliver nuclear weapons. 
They can be detonated on board ships in a harbor, or they can simply be smuggled across 
national borders. Apart from the above-mentioned difficulties active defense confronts, 
passive defense is no good at all either. Because a nuclear explosion brings two kinds of 
effects (prompt and delayed effects) with it, the end result is unacceptable: A simple 
nuclear explosion has intense prompt effects such as blast, radiation and heat and delayed 
effects such as radioactive fallouts and sudden firestorms. As a consequence of all, 
meaningful defense against nuclear weapons either by active or passive means, is 
extremely difficult.  
 
1.3 Characteristics of Biological Weapons 
The killing mechanism of a biological weapon is disease. Human beings have yet 
to experience full power of these detestable weapons, for there have been only a few 
instances of biological weapons attacks, with the most rudimentary types of it. For the 
target to be attacked, it must be infected through successful dissemination of a 
weaponized biological agent. As to the route of primary attack by BW, it is mainly of six: 
                                                 
13 For the linchpin of the issue and one of the cornerstone sources please see, Thomas  C. Schelling and 
Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, New York: Pergamon Press Inc. 1985; Stuart Croft, 
Strategies of Arms Control, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996, pp. 138-146 
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Inhalation, ingestion of contaminated food and water, contamination of an open wound 
with bacterial warfare agent, insect vectors and ballistic and cruise missiles, and spraying 
them by means of aircraft15.  
There are several differences of biological weapons from nuclear weapons such as 
the dispersing method’s complexity, meteorological conditions, survival of the agents and 
their delayed affects. Biological agents cannot be dispersed by a single-point explosion, 
but must be spread by distinct mechanisms like spray tanks or by dispersing separate 
mini-munitions over a wide area. In doing the latter, a missile’s payload is fractionated 
and cluster munitions are prepared for biological weapons. This is not an easy task, and 
only advanced states have it by far16. 
Meteorological conditions affect the delivery environment very much. For 
instance, windy weather or a shade, or whether a day time or night make considerable 
differences on their impact depending upon the agents' characteristics. Meteorological 
conditions also affect the survival of the agents; temperature in particular is critically 
crucial of their survival duration. Their survival is generally of short duration and their 
effects may be delayed for days to weeks. The lethality of biological weapons is 
controversial and much has been written on it17, but test data are limited. In assessing 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Dennis M. Gormley, “Hedging Against the Cruise-Missile Threat”, in Survival Vol.40, No.1, Spring 
1998, pp. 97-103. 
15 Brad Roberts, "The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Trends and Consequences"; in Oliver Thranert 
(ed.), Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention, Bonn: Dietz, 1996, pp.57-66; Douglas Holdstock, 
“Biotechnology and Biological Warfare”, Peace Review, 12:4 2000, pp.549-553; Peter Hadfield, “Lethal 
Legacy” in New Scientist, Vol. 169, Issue 2276, 02/03/2001, p.5 
16 Graham S. Pearson, “Biological Weapons: Their Nature and Arms Control”, in Efraim Karsh and Martin 
S. Navias (eds.) Non-Conventional-Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East-Tackling the Spread of 
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities New York: Oxford Uni. Press, 1993, pp.111-114; Panofsky, 
op. cit. pp.3-9. 
17 Graham S. Pearson, “Biological Weapons: Their Nature and Arms Central”, in Efraim Karsh and Martin 
S. Navias (eds.) Non-Conventional-Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East-Tackling the Spread of 
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities New York: Oxford Uni. Press, 1993, pp. 99-133; Edward 
M. Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Study of Proliferation, Great Britain The Macmillan Press 
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weapons lethality, the ratio of potential lethality to the total weight of the material is a 
criterion that can be used to make comparisons. According to that criterion, and given 
that a weaponized virulent biological agent is widely distributed over an exposed 
population under best circumstances (such as shade, warm weather, and a suitable speed 
and direction of wind) biological weapons’ ratio of lethality could be comparable to that 
of nuclear weapons.   
As a hedge against biological agents, one passive measure that can be taken is 
mass preventive vaccinations. It can be effective but only if the type of biological agent is 
known. From 1998 onwards US troops in the Persian Gulf use these vaccines as 
preventive measures18. Anthrax, against which they are protected, is known to be widely 
produced in Iraq and Iran19. Nevertheless, it can be a futile attempt when an attacker has 
an alternative agent available in its stockpile. The other side of the defensive battle, active 
defenses option, does not offer an optimistic picture against BW or CW. Active defenses 
against them are problematic for various delivery options available to the enemy whether 
it be a state-sponsored proxy group or a state. 
1.4 Characteristics of Chemical Weapons  
                                                                                                                                                 
Ltd., 1994, pp. 130-153; Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, op cit. p. 1-4; Seth Carus, “Biological Warfare Threats 
in Perspective” in The Brooking Institution Web page, http://www.brook.edu/fp/events/19980427 
_carus.htm; Brookings Ins. Proliferation Brief, Vol.2, No.11, July 1 1999 “Understanding the BW Threat”; 
Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat”, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July, 
August, 1999, pp.2-8; Ronald M. Atlas, “Medical Biological Nature of the Threat of Biological Weapons to 
US Security” in Brookings Ins. Foreign Policy Events Web Page; Gert G. Harigel, “Chemical and 
Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment”, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace Web Site, 3/25/01 http://www.ceip.org / files /publications ;Federation of American 
Scientists, Chemical /Biological/ Radiological Incident Handbook, October1998, http://www.fas.org 
/irp/threat/cbw/CBR.htm 
18 Brad Roberts, “The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Trends and Consequences; in Oliver Thranert 
(ed.), Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention, Bonn: Dietz, 1996, pp.57-66. 
19 Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington DC, February 2001, Online Source, csis.org, “Strategic Assessment”, p.16; Vice 
Admiral Thomas K. Wilson, Military Threats and Security Challenges Through 2015, Defense Intelligence 
Agency, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, US, 2 February 2000, pp. 21-23. 
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Chemical weapons are devices that disseminate poisons and other toxic 
substances usually in the form of gases, liquids or sprays. They are relatively easy to 
manufacture, deploy and store when compared to biological and nuclear weapons20. 
Stockpiling of biological weapons entails much care, and that of nuclear weapons is 
much more expensive and entails a big infrastructure and space when compared to 
chemical weapons. CW are easy to manufacture because many of the materials used in 
their fabrication have civil and commercial uses21. 
Unlike the case for defense against nuclear weapons, protection with various 
degrees of efficiency is possible against chemical and biological weapons (CBW). 
However, inconvenient it may be for military forces on the battlefield for maneuvering 
and attacking, still there are passive defenses such as gas masks, protective clothing and 
vaccination. Technical means, protective gear-gas masks and special clothing, work for 
the defense against CW22. Since only nuclear weapons are completely indiscriminate by 
their explosive power, heat, blast, radiation, and radioactivity having a global 
repercussion, chemical arms or more preferably fitting jargon weaponized chemical 
agents are usable in a particular region, rather than, causing global security problems. 
These arguments are evidenced by a United Nations study23, which examines the 
compared hypothetical results of an attack, carried out by one strategic bomber using any 
of the three weapons. 
                                                 
20 “Devils’s Brew’s in Detail”; http://www.sipri.org, CBW project  Website ; Chemical Handbook-October 
1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/CBR_hdbk.htm 
21 Gert Harigel, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment”; 
http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/Harigelreport 
22 Such protective gear can be made available although it reduces the performance of troops in combat. To 
a more limited extent, civilian populations may benefit from those means as demonstrated in the case of 
Israel during the Gulf War. 
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The results are as follows: A one-megaton nuclear bomb can kill 90 percent of 
unprotected people over an area of 300 square kilometers. A chemical weapon of 15 tons 
might kill 50 percent of the people in a 60 square kilometers area, but a 10-ton biological 
agent efficiently weaponized could kill 25 percent of the people, and make 50 percent ill, 
over an area of 100,000 square kilometers. These numbers are assumed under the 
circumstances that the chemical and biological agents can be dispersed over a large 
surface and reach the ground level, whereas nuclear weapons can be exploded at any 
altitude and on ground level with the desired military efficiency. Even extended use of 
chemical weapons had no decisive impact on outcome of wars, had only local success, 
and it only made wars uncomfortable to no purpose24. It entailed to wear protective gear, 
and for the user made it hard to occupy or transport troops from the area in which it is 
used. In spite of all the limitations of their use, chemical weapons are still around and 
being produced in the very first place, and they are still kept in the military arsenals as 
weapons of response in kind or flexible response25. They had been produced in enormous 
quantities, and their elimination entails huge costs.  
 
1.5 Missions Assigned to Weapons Destruction 
In accordance with their different features, the potential military roles or missions 
assigned to the three types of unconventional weapons-chemical, biological and nuclear 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 Gert Harigel, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment"; 
http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/Harigelreport; and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
(CBRN) Terrorism, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat. 
24 Center for Nonproliferation Studies (http://cns.miis.edu); CB Warfare and Defenses, Chemical & 
Biological Weapons Resource Page, http://www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/protect.htm, "Protection against 
Chemical Weapons". 
25 Anthony H. Cordesman, WMD in Iraq, Center of Strategic and International Studies (Online Database), 
www.csis.org February 2001, p.19; Kenneth M. Pollack, “Current Iraqi Military Capabilities: An 
 17
weapons-are very different. The nuclear weapons policies of superpowers26 are in a 
continuous evolution, but in the post-Cold War era, it is in the opposite direction 
compared to that of the Cold War. Russia facing conventional upper hand of the Western 
forces adopted a policy similar to the former NATO doctrine for compensating its 
perceived conventional inferiority by means of counting on the unconventional complex 
war tools, nuclear weapons27. Hence, the mission of nuclear weapons is the maintenance 
of deterrence, while CBW are seen basically as terrorist weapons that can be used for 
unconventional warfare or terrorism.   
1.6 Radiological Weapons 
Radiological weapons (RW) are basically a nuclear-weapon variant designed to 
kill through radiation only, as opposed to blast or shock. The radioactive materials for 
radiological weapons could be fission products, plutonium and other actinides from 
civilian nuclear reactors, or artificially produced radioactive nuclides UN inspectors 
uncovered evidence that Iraq was working on RW prior to the Gulf War28. Furthermore, 
radiological impact of the use of depleted uranium ammunition concerns have been 
expressed about the possible health and environmental consequences of exposure to 
depleted uranium (DU) arising from the use of this material ten years ago in the Gulf, and 
subsequently in the Balkans. This exposure could have been caused by external radiation 
                                                                                                                                                 
Assessment”, by the courtesy of Washington Institute in Middle East Review of International Affairs, Issue 
4/ February 1998, p.3 
26 'Superpower' is used in strict military sense in that nuclear capable states which have second-strike 
capabilities: The United States, and the Russian Federation.  
27 Russian/Soviet Doctrine, www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/intro.htm; “Russian National Security 
Blueprint”, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 26 December, 1997, pp. 4-5; The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation, www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm; Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Russia’s New 
Concept of National Security and the Military Doctrine” in Avrasya Dosyası-Rusya Özel Sayısı, February 
2001, pp.16-18 
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arising from DU or by the inhalation, ingestion or intake through wounds of DU spread in 
the environment. It has also been suggested that adverse health effects, notably leukaemia 
and other forms of cancer, could be attributable to such exposure. 
Uranium is a naturally occurring radioactive material; its three principal 
radioactive isotopes are U-238, U-235 and U-234. One of the by-products of the process 
of uranium enrichment is DU that is comprised almost entirely from U-238 isotopes. It is 
about 60% as radioactive as natural uranium. Physically and chemically, DU behaves in 
the same way as natural uranium. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) has outlined several scenarios for radiological warfare29. For offensive purposes, 
they could be used to force mass evacuations, create economic chaos, or occupy territory, 
avoiding the infrastructure damage involved in a nuclear explosion. On the defensive 
side, RW can be used to deny an enemy territory trough contamination, making it 
impassable. 
The effects of radiological weapons are essentially similar to the effects of nuclear 
weapons, and long-term radiation effects of RW may become burdensome to states 
attacked on medical facilities and pose social and economic long-term recovery 
difficulties. They can be delivered by missiles either ballistic or cruise, or by an aircraft-
delivered bomb. RW may consist of bombs or shells packed with radioactive materials 
and can be delivered by means of ordinary (conventional or non-nuclear) explosives. 
Besides, radioactive materials can also be delivered in the form of liquid or solid aerosols 
                                                                                                                                                 
28“Devil’s Brew’s in Detail”, Devil’s Brews http://www.cdiss.org/rw.htm; United Nations,” UN. Says Iraq 
worked on radiological weapon”, 1995 Reuters Information Service, Nov 7, 1995. Also available web-
based version in www.nando.net/ntn/world.htm  
29 “Devils’s Brew’s in Detail”; http://www.sipri.org,CBW project Website ; Chemical Handbook-October 
1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/CBR_hdbk.htm;“Radiological Weapons” Iraq Special Weapons, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/other/radiological.htm 
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by aerial spraying through use of an aircraft or by means of an UAV (Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle). Three potential targets for RW include population centers, the water supplies of 
an adversary and nuclear reactors. In population centers, they may cause mass casualties 
over short and long-term and force large-scale evacuation. Radioactive substances could 
contaminate the water supplies of an adversary, and lastly, if nuclear reactors are 
attacked, a costly and dangerous radiological incident may occur. However, it has its own 
limitations for the country using them and its neighbors. It poses long-term contamination 
hazards, in addition to provoking possible nuclear retaliation against the user, in the light 
of the given security doctrines of NWS (Nuclear weapon states)30.  
 In the Middle East, the immediate sphere of concern for Turkey comprises of 
states adjacent to it: Iran, Iraq and Syria. The common characteristics these states share, 
Philip Robins argues, entail serious caution from Turkey’s point of view.31 All these 
states have regional leadership aspirations and they have resources to give substance to 
these aspirations. They all have common borders with Turkey, while all share a deep 
fundamental suspicion of Turkey. And, finally all three are formally anti-Western. Hence, 
it is prudent for Turkey to keep a close eye on them. To start with Iraq, it is essential to 
examine the Iraqi actions from 1980s onwards so as to figure out the characteristics of the 
current regime under Saddam Hussein’s control. Therefore, Iran-Iraq War and crisis over 
Kuwait  is examined with regard to the Iraqi regime’s nature. Furthermore, because the 
threat Iraq poses depends upon its ability to overcome the economic and military 
                                                 
30 China’s Position on Nuclear Disarmament, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/4492.html, 30/04/2001; Basic 
Nuclear Features, Questions of Command and Control; NATO Nuclear Sharing and the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty Chapter III: NATO Doctrine Since the End of the Cold War, http://www.basicint.org/nuk-
nukesharing-part4.htm; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Clinton Directive Changes Strategy On Nuclear Arms; 
Centering on Deference, officials Drop Terms for Long Atomic War”, Sunday, December 7, 1997; Page 
A01, Washington Post. 
31 Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, London: Pinter Publishers, 1991, p.48 
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sanctions imposed on it, a brief examination of the current sanctions situation also takes 
place. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CAPABILITIES OF 
NEIGHBORING STATES TO TURKEY 
2.1 Past and Recent Developments Regarding Iraq 
Among the three adjacent states to Turkey, namely Iran, Iraq and Syria, Iraq 
seems to be the most aggressive and militarist state. It invaded Iran and Kuwait and used 
chemical weapons against its own civilians. 32Iraq used chemical weapons extensively 
and continuously against Iran from 1982 to 1986 during the Iran-Iraq War. 33Prior to the 
invasion of Iran by Iraq, Saddam Hussein may have felt threatened by Khomeini and the 
Iranian Revolution. 34 It might also have attempted to exploit Iran’s apparent military 
weakness owing to a series of upheavals during the Iranian revolution. The US embassy 
hostage crisis35 cut Iran off from Western arms and military support furthering the 
military weakness of Iran. Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, 1980, most probably 
evaluating all these developments above as a window of opportunity for asserting itself in 
                                                 
32 Iraq did not hesitate to use poison gas against its own civilians while fighting the battle of Halabjah 
during the Iran-Iraq War. 
33 Javed Ali, “Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War. A Case Study in Noncompliance”, The 
Nonproliferation Review, Vol.8, No.1, Spring 2001, pp.22-26.  
34 Although many political forces, including liberal, nationalist and Marxist, did play a powerful part in the 
overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi in February 1979, it was dominated by a militant Islamic ideology which 
quickly won the intra-revolutionary battles and consolidated its control over the state. Iran gave the world 
its first radical Islamic republic and provided a new inspiration to political Islam everywhere. The Iranian 
revolution was the first mass movement in history to establish an Islamic theocratic state. Iran’s fervor to 
export the revolution frightened the existing political order whether secular or conservative Islamic in West 
Asia and the Middle East constituting “a structural threat” to regional states. Furthermore, the new 
revolutionary state in Iran was seen as reflecting not just Islamic militancy but also the Persian ambitions 
for a larger influence in the Middle East. When Khomeini became the leader of the revolution, he 
immediately called for the overthrow of the secular regime in Iraq. He also sent religious messengers to the 
Shi’ites of Iraq.  
35 The US embassy hostage crisis refer to the events following the seizure of the American Embassy in 
Tehran by Iranian students on November 4,1979. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran by an Islamic 
revolutionary government led to a steady deterioration in Iran-US relations. 
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the Middle East. 36Iraq won the Iran-Iraq War to the point he forced Iran to accept a 
cease-fire. Iraq had no remarkable gains, but bankrupted, and had $80 billion worth of 
debt to his neighbors, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and to France and Russia. However, Iraq 
emerged from the Iran-Iraq War with a large and well-equipped military, one which was 
the most effective and experienced force in the Gulf region. After the war Iraq demanded 
its debts to be forgiven under the Arab cause. However, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia refused 
to forgive its debts. This prevented Iraq from enhancing its oil revenues. It appears that 
Iraq interpreted the growing ties between the United States and the Southern Gulf States 
as an effort to encircle itself. It might have seen the decline of Soviet power as a further 
threat to its interests.37 Iraqis might have thought that the US was deliberately prolonging 
the Iran-Iraq War to weaken both countries. The Iran-Contra deal38 probably reinforced 
Iraq’s distrust of the United States. Russia tilted towards Iran during late 1980s, and this 
scarcely caused a good Iraqi-Russian cooperation39.  Seemingly, these conspiracy 
theories in the back of the mind of the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, as well as his 
ambition to assert Iraq as a major Gulf and Arab power led to the invasion of Kuwait by 
Iraq in August 1990.40 The invasion of Kuwait, together with the invasion of Iran 
demonstrated that Iraq is an aggressive, opportunistic and militarist state using any means 
possible including the use of chemical weapons in realizing its goals. 
                                                 
36 Jon B. Alterman, “The Gulf States and the American Umbrella” Middle East Review of International 
Affairs, Vol.4, No.4, December 2000, pp.1-3. 
37 Anthony Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions; London: Praeger, 1999, p.16. 
38  The Iran-Contra Affair concerned two secret Reagan administration policies whose operations were 
coordinated by National Security Council Staff. The Iran operation involved efforts in 1985 and 1986 to 
obtain the release of Americans held hostage in the Middle East through the sale of US weapons to Iran, 
despite an embargo on such sales. The contra operations from 1984 to 1986 involved the secret 
governmental support of contra military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua, despite congressional 
prohibition of this support. 
39 Anthony Cordesman, op. cit. p.17 
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 Confronted with the threat of impeded flow of oil, which imperilled the national 
interests of some national Security Council member states such as the UK, US and 
France, a multinational coalition is forged, led by the United States but operating under 
UN mandate, to liberate Kuwait. The politics of oil entailed the prevention of Iraqi 
aggression from destabilizing other vital oil-producing countries of the Gulf. The 
Coalition forces under the UN mandate conducted Operation Desert Storm and Iraq was 
evicted from Kuwait. Security Council Resolution 687 passed in April 1991 was 
ostensibly intended to rid the world of Iraq’s weapons of mass destructors. 41 UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 set the terms for the cease-fire in the Gulf 
War. It calls for the dismantling of Iraq’s WMD and long-range missiles and the means to 
produce them. It does not specifically mention cruise missiles, but the United Nations 
Special Commission (UNSCOM) interpreted it to ban long-range cruise missiles.42 It also 
gives UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the right to 
conduct challenge inspections and to supervise the destruction of Iraq’s CBRN, ballistic 
and cruise missile capabilities. Since the end of the Gulf War, there is a struggle between 
Iraq and the UN in which Iraq tries to break out of the controls and sanctions the UN 
established as part of the cease-fire in the Gulf War. Baghdad adamantly resisted the 
terms of the cease-fire agreement, which required it to cooperate with the UNSCOM and 
the IAEA.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 Efraim Karsh and Jnari Kautsi, “Why Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Survival, vol. XXXIII, no.1, 
January/February 1991, pp. 18-25. 
41 Please see the views of a former inspector on the UN Resolutions and the American foreign policy 
regarding Iraq. Scott Ritter, “The Saddam Trap-Lessons in Failed Foreign Policies”, Harvard International 
Review, Winter 2001, pp. 28-32. 
42 Dennis M. Gormley, “Hedging Against the Cruise-Missile Threat”, Survival, vol.40, no.1, Spring 1998, 
pp.92-96. 
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The struggle between Iraq and UN-mainly the UK and the US-is a struggle to 
shape Iraq’s conventional and unconventional military power. It is also a struggle to limit 
Iraq’s capability to threaten its neighbours and to change the Iraqi regime through the 
removal of Saddam Hussein. This struggle continues for over ten years since the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. Baghdad’s persistent resistance towards the terms of the cease-fire 
agreement-its policy of denial and deception towards UNSCOM-culminated with the 
allied bombing of Iraq under Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.43 Since late 1998, 
Baghdad has refused to allow UN weapons inspectors into Iraq as required by the cease-
fire agreement and UN Security Council resolutions. 44 As a consequence of Iraqi refusal 
to accept inspectors, there have been no UN inspections for over two years as of 2001. 
Although Iraq was crumbling under economic sanctions, and Saddam Hussein’s army 
was largely devastated during the operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, he has grown 
more confident in his ability to hold on to his power since the end of the Gulf War. 
 Iraq may have begun to win its struggle against the UK and the United States, and 
in attempting to preserve its military capabilities and WMD. Saddam Hussein had some 
success in ending Iraq’s international isolation. Since August 2000, nearly 40 aircraft 
have flown to Baghdad without obtaining UN approval widening the holes in the UN air 
embargo.45 Several authors underscore that in Saddam Hussein’s case, capabilities may 
                                                 
43 Marc Weller, The US, Iraq and the Use of Force in a Unipolar World”, Survival, 41-4, Winter 1999-
2000, pp.81-90. 
44 UN Security Council Resolutions 687,707, 715 and 1284 set forth the conditions necessary for 
terminating the sanctions and the terms for the weapons inspections. UNSCR 1284, adapted in December 
1999, established a follow-on regime to UNSCOM called the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and 
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Iraqi regime refused to accept any UN inspections for over two 
years. Because of the collapse of the inspection regime established by UNSCOM and the Iraqi rejection of 
UNSCR 1284, there is no vehicle for lifting the economic sanctions. 
45 Michael Eisenstadt, “The United States, Iraq, and Iran: Proliferating Risks, Dwindling Opportunities”, 
Policy Watch – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 15, 2001, p.1. 
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well mean intentions.46 He has repeatedly demonstrated that he is willing to take extreme 
political and military risks ignoring the world opinion. He proved to be a crisis-escalator 
with little warning. Thus, his endeavors to overcome sanctions and to preserve his 
military capabilities take on special meaning for Turkey. In other words, the threat 
coming from Iraq originates in the Iraqi ability to preserve and, perhaps improve its 
military capabilities including WMD. In turn, its capabilities are consequent upon the 
outcome of efforts to punctuate the air embargo. 
 
2.1 Past and Recent Developments Regarding Iraq 
2.1.1 Why Does Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability of Iraq Constitute 
A Threat? 
From Turkey’s point of view, several reasons can be maintained in regarding Iraqi 
efforts to acquire WMD as militarily and politically threatening. First, the availability of 
WMD to a potential rival or adversary raises the cost of any future conflict increasing the 
amount of damage the adversary could inflict against military units or civilian population 
in cities. Second, WMD when used can readily alter the political environment in the 
Middle Eastern countries and in Turkey where political power is concentrated on a single 
city, the capital. Third, WMD and ballistic missiles increase the risk that Turkey will be 
deterred from threatening or beginning armed hostilities against an adversary. 
                                                 
46 Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, former head of UNSCOM, “From UNSCOM to UNMOVIC: The future of 
Weapons Inspections in Iraq, “Policy Watch-The Washington Institute for Near East Policy , July 18, 2000, 
pp. 1-3; George Tenet, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: A New Dimension in US Middle East Policy”, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.4, No.2, June 2000, pp.2-8; Joseph Cirincione, 
“Assessing the Ballistic Missile Threat”, Carneige Endowment for International Peace-Nonproliferation 
Project, http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications; Al J. Venter, “New-Era Threat: Iraq’s Biological 
Weapons”, Middle East Policy, Vol.VI, No.4, June 1999, pp.106-108; Micheal Eisenstadt, “US Military 
Capabilities in the Post Cold-War Era: Implications for Middle East Allies”, Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, Vol 2, No.4, November 1998, pp.17-19. 
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Iraq’s clandestine efforts to obtain WMD and missile capabilities made creeping 
proliferation a key part of the arms race in the Gulf and the Middle East. Its use of 
chemical weapons and missiles against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War caused Iran to 
become a major proliferator in return. Iraq’s missile launches against Israel and Saudi 
Arabia during the Gulf War expanded the threat of using WMD to include the whole Gulf 
region. This made the problem of proliferation in the Arab-Israeli arms race and the 
problem of proliferation in the Gulf intertwined. It is argued that Iraq retains the 
technology to rapidly produce chemical and biological weapons the moment that 
sanctions lose all of their restraining impact.47 Accordingly, Iraq could quickly increase 
the threat it could pose to key military units in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, to western forces in 
the region, or to ports and air bases in Turkey. It is then important to consider how Iraq’s 
forces can evolve while UN sanctions continue, and what Iraq is likely to do when 
sanctions are lifted. It is crucial to consider the threat posed by WMD and impact of any 
major new transfer of weapons in the future. As a consequence of all, any military 
analysis of Iraq must try to examine present and potential Iraqi war-fighting capabilities. 
 
2.1 Past and Recent Developments Regarding Iraq 
2.1.2 Iraqi Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction 
The most serious concern with Iraq is the likelihood that it will seek a renewed 
WMD capability for credibility, so as to have the ability to deter other states, because 
every other strong regime in the region either has it or is pursuing it. Director of US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) George J. Tenet states that the Iraqis have rebuilt key 
                                                 
47 Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies www.csis.org, Strategic Assessment, February 2001, p.5 
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portions of their chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use. 
The plants Iraq is rebuilding, Tenet declares, were used to make chemical weapons 
precursors before the Gulf War and that their capacity exceeds Iraq’s needs to satisfy its 
civilian requirements. Central Intelligence Agency estimate of Iraqi threat stresses the 
developments in Iraq about dual-use research, development and production in the 
biological weapons and ballistic missile fields. It is pointed out that Iraq has rebuilt 
several critical missile production complexes. 48 Iraq’s stubborn rejection of the terms of 
the cease-fire agreement and previous judgments about Iraqi regime’s characteristics give 
reason to extrapolating that Iraq may have begun such reconstitution efforts and that it 
possibly will again threaten its neighbors. 
 
2.1 Past and Recent Developments Regarding Iraq 
2.1.3 Iraqi Nuclear Program 
Iraq has ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Nevertheless, before 
the Gulf War, Iraq had a huge nuclear weapons development program 49 whose focal 
point was to build an implosion type device. After Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi nuclear 
infrastructure suffered considerable damage from coalition bombing and IAEA 
dismantlement. Still, it retains scientists, engineers and nuclear weapons design 
information.50 It is estimated that without fissile material it would need five or more years 
and significant foreign assistance to rebuild its nuclear program and produce nuclear 
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devices. 51 Inspections by UN teams have found evidence of two successful weapons 
designs, a neutron initiator, explosives and triggering technology needed for production 
of bombs, plutonium processing technology, centrifuge technology, calutron enrichment 
technology and experiments with chemical separation technology.52 
Iraq’s main nuclear weapons facilities were of ten. “Al Atheer” being the center 
of nuclear weapons program. The facility had systems for uranium metallurgy, designing 
remote controlled systems for high explosives manufacture and production of shaped 
charges for bombs. At the “Al Tuwaitha” facility, Iraqis were studying on triggering 
systems, neutron initiators, uranium metallurgy, and hot cells for plutonium separation. 
There were also prototype-scale gas centrifuge, prototype electromagnetic separation 
facility and testing of laser isotope separation technology. Another facility, “Al Qa Qa” 
was used for storing high explosives and testing of detonators for high explosive 
component of implosion nuclear weapons. “Ash Sharqat” was designed for mass 
production of weapons grade material using electromagnetic isotope separation. What is 
more, “Al Furat” was designed for mass production of weapons grade material using 
centrifuge method. 53 
Iraq had three reactor programs. First, “Osiraq/Tammuz-I” was a 40 megawatt 
light-water reactor destroyed by Israeli air attack in 1981. “Second Isis/Tammuz-II” was 
an 800- kilowatt light water reactor that was destroyed by coalition air attack in 1991 
during operation Desert Storm. Finally, IRT-5000 was a 5-megawatt light water reactor 
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again damaged by coalition air attack in 1991. It is claimed that Iraq used calutron, 
centrifuges, plutonium processing, chemical defusion methods and foreign purchases to 
create new production capability after Israel destroyed most of Osiraq. 54 Iraq established 
a centrifuge enrichment system in Rashidya and conducted research into the nuclear fuel 
cycle to develop a nuclear device. 55  
After invading Kuwait, Iraq attempted to accelerate its program to develop a 
nuclear weapon by using radioactive fuel from French and Russian-build reactors. 56 It 
made a crash effort in September 1990 to recover enriched fuel from its supposedly safe-
guarded French and Russian-built reactors, with the goal of producing a nuclear weapon 
by April, 1991. The program was only halted after coalition air raids destroyed key 
facilities in January 17,1991.57 
On November 7, 1995, chief UN weapons inspector Rolf Ekeus announced that 
Iraq worked on producing a radiological weapon, which scatters deadly radioactive 
material without causing a nuclear explosion. 58 He disclosed that orders were given in 
1987 to explore the use of radiological weapons for area denial in the Iran-Iraq War. Iraqi 
claims made to UNSCOM maintains that three tests were made, but the results of them 
were disappointing and the project was shelved. UNSCOM officials state that there has 
been no records or evidence to prove that it is shelved. UNSCOM believes that Iraq’s 
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nuclear program has been largely disabled and remains incapacitated, but warns that Iraq 
retains substantial technology. Iraq also established a clandestine purchasing system in 
1990 that it has used to import forbidden components since the Gulf War. Taking into 
consideration the time lapse from 1998 onwards, the period during which no inspections 
were conducted, it seems plausible to argue that Iraq reconstituted its efforts to 
proliferate. 
UN inspection teams consistently declared that there is no reason to assume that 
Iraqi declarations were comprehensive. There are major uncertainties vis-à-vis Iraqi 
nuclear and radiological programs.59 Accordingly, it is never known whether Iraq 
concealed an effective high-speed centrifuge program, or whether there are elements for 
radiological weapons. It is equally elusive whether Iraq is actively seeking to 
clandestinely buy components for nuclear weapons. It may be examining the purchase of 
fissile material from other countries such as North Korea, China or Russian Federation.60 
As stated before, Iraq still retains the technology developed before the Gulf War, and 
experts believe that an ongoing research effort continues.61 Further, it is unclear if Iraq is 
sustaining its development of a missile warhead suited to the use of, and as a corollary of 
a nuclear device. 
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Al J. Venter reports that former head of UNSCOM, Richard Butler disclosed in 
New York recently that the Iraqi dictator had reassembled his nuclear weapons team.62 
Since Dr. Khidhir Hamza’s the most senior Iraqi nuclear physicist to have defected to the 
West-defection to America, he has made some astonishing disclosures. During an 
interview with Washington’s Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), he 
stated that the first and most comprehensive help received by him in his trial to build a 
nuclear weapon was information from the US Atomic Energy Project, which are the 
library copies of the 1940s Manhattan Project. 63 These copies were acquired by Iraqi 
students who sought for them in US university libraries. Dr. Hamza noted that certain 
government sectors including agriculture, oil and others were used as he put it, “as 
needed to smuggle equipment and obtain information not available elsewhere”. He told in 
detail how Iraqi atomic energy smuggles equipment and obtain information clandestinely 
through use of various ministries. Dr. Hamza, in answering to a question as to how all 
this activity was kept secret from the International Atomic Energy Agencies’ inspections 
that took place before the Gulf War, replied that “when the inspectors arrived we would 
just lock the doors to the areas where we were working to enrich uranium for the bomb.” 
He goes on to tell the developments regarding build-up of a nuclear weapon in Osiraq 
before Israeli Air Force attacked it.64  
Asked whether in the case of Saddam Hussein using a bomb, for example, on 
Israel, it would be airdropped, Dr. Hamza replied: 
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Yes, I think that is why work is still being done now. When you have a 
nuclear weapon you need to harden it to take the stresses of the 
journey, staying together and working. This hardening we did not have 
in 1990. We barely managed to make a mock-up of an actual bomb 
without a core. Working on the actual hardening started after the 
[Gulf] War and I think that now they have a bomb that could stay 
together.65 
Questioned on the consequences of sanctions against Iraq and how an inflow of 
scientists to Iraq might affect the timescale for reconstitution of viable Iraqi nuclear 
threat, Dr. Hamza explained: 
Right now, I don’t know if the uranium is there, but the design is 
there. The construction is difficult and would probably take a few 
months. It all depends on how they get the fissile material. Saddam 
can either start a fissile material programme in Iraq-the enrichment 
programme-in which case it may take him two or three years to have 
it. Or he can get it smuggled from abroad, for example from Russia. 
Then he will have it immediately.66  
Dr. Hamza also disclosed that the companies contacted for the procurement of a 
nuclear device indicated that they knew the equipment was not for peaceful purposes. 
 
2.1 Past and Recent Developments Regarding Iraq 
2.1.4 Iraqi Chemical Weapons Program 
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Since the Gulf War, Baghdad has rebuilt key portions of its industrial and 
chemical production infrastructure. It is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC). Iraq is known to have produced and stockpiled mustard, tabun, sarin, and VX, 
some of which likely remain hidden.67 In late 1998, UNSCOM reported to the UN 
Security Council that Iraq continued to withhold information related to its chemical 
program.68 Besides, UNSCOM discovered evidence of VX, a persistent nerve agent, in 
missile warheads in 1998 despite Iraqi denials for seven years that it did not weaponize 
VX. In revelations to the UN, Iraq admitted that prior to the Gulf War, it maintained large 
stockpiles of mustard gas, and the nerve agents sarin and tabun. 69 It also admitted that it 
produced binary sarin filled artillery shells, 122 mm rockets, and aerial bombs. Iraqis, 
later on, were forced to accept that they manufactured enough precursors to produce 70 
tons of the nerve agent VX. They tested ricin, which is a deadly nerve agent for use in 
artillery shells, most importantly, Iraqi administration accepted that it conducted three 
flight tests of long-range Scuds-ballistic missiles-with chemical warheads. 70 The 
destruction of the related weapons and feedstocks has not been verified by UNSCOM. 
Iraq is claimed to have at least 3,800 kg's of V-agents by the time of the Gulf War, and 
12-16 missile warheads. During 1991-1994 period, UNSCOM supervised the destruction 
of 690 tons of chemical warfare agents and more than 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals. 
The majority of Iraq’s chemical agents were manufactured at a supposed pesticide plant 
located at Muthanna. Muthanna State Establishment is Iraq’s primary CW research, 
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production, filling and storage site. Other production facilities include Salman Pak, 
Samara and Habbiniyah. UNSCOM reports indicate that Iraq possesses the technology to 
produce a variety of persistent and non-persistent chemical agents.71 In addition to that 
UNSCOM reports that Iraq has failed to account for special missile warheads intended 
for filling with chemical or biological warfare agent. Iraq also did not account for 
107,500 empty casings for chemical weapons. Iraq has developed basic chemical 
warhead designs for Scud missiles, rockets, bombs, and shells. Iraq also has spray 
dispersal systems. The UN team of experts states that Iraq has offered no evidence that it 
has destroyed its VX production capability and stockpile.72 UNSCOM in its 1998 report 
to UN Security Council, points out the fact that Iraq continues to withhold information 
regarding its chemical program. UNSCOM inspectors discovered an Air Force document 
indicating that Iraq did not consume as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq War as 
declared by Baghdad. The report shows that Iraq may have an additional 6,000 CW 
munitions hidden. According to Rolf Ekeus, Iraq is not eager to store any CW or BW. 
Iraq views, he argues, those weapons as tactical assets instead of strategic assets. Iraq has 
been aiming to keep the capability to start up production immediately should it needs 
to.73 The State Department of US report in September 1999 notes that Iraq continues to 
deny weaponizing VX nerve agent despite the fact that UNSCOM found VX nerve agent 
residues on Iraqi Scud missile warhead fragments, International experts concluded that 
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Iraq has the know-how and process equipment, and may  have  enough precursors to 
manufacture 200 tons of VX. Directorate of Intelligence Nonproliferation Center reported 
in February 2000 that there is no direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since 
Desert Fox to reconstitute its WMD programs, though given its past behavior, this type of 
activity must be regarded as likely.74 The UN assesses that Baghdad has the capability to 
reinitiate both its CW and BW programs within a few weeks to months.75 
 
2.1 Past and Recent Developments Regarding Iraq 
2.1.5 Iraqi Biological Weapons Program 
For four year (1991-1995) Iraq has claimed that it conducted only defensive 
research on biological weapons. In 1995, Iraq reluctantly admitted it produced anthrax, 
botulinum toxins and aflatoxins and that it prepared biological agent-filled munitions 
such as missile warheads and aerial bombs.76 UNSCOM believes that Iraq produced 
greater amount of bioagents than it admitted. Iraq also admitted that during the Persian 
Gulf War, it deployed biological agent-filled munitions to airfields. Iraqi administration 
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disclosed that these weapons were intended to use against Israel and coalition forces in 
Saudi Arabia. 77 UNSCOM believes that Baghdad has the ability to reconstitute its 
biological warfare capabilities in the absence of inspections and monitoring during 1999 
and 2000.78 
Iraqi endeavors to produce BW are of economic origin. Due to economic 
sanctions, biological weapons are extremely attractive to opt for: Casualties might cost 
$2000 per square kilometer with conventional weapons, $800 with nerve gas (CW), and a 
single dollar with biological weapons.79 Richard Butler, one of the former executive 
chairman of UNSCOM said in an interview that “biological weapons are easier and 
cheaper to make than any other arms and can be deployed with less difficulty”. Another 
official, a spokesman for UNSCOM, Ewen Buchanan explained that 30 tons of Iraq’s 
biological warfare agents were unaccounted for. The list included 1,900 liters of 
botulinum toxin, 8500 liters of anthrax and two tons of aflatoxins, which if dispersed in 
aerosol and droplet clouds could in theory poison the entire world.80 He adds that 30 tons 
of unaccounted bioagents are only Iraq’s declaration, and warns that Iraq may hide more 
of them. 
In the desert, a short distance from the Tigris River, about 60 km.s southwest of 
Baghdad, is where Al Hakam locates. Iraqi officials told UNSCOM inspectors four year 
ago that Al Hakam was involved in the production of single-cell protein in yeast as a 
supplement for chicken food and in the cultivation of BT ( bacillus thuringiensis ), a 
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bacterium that acts as an insecticide when applied to crops. Al J Venter states that it took 
UN inspectors four more years to discover that the Iraqi declarations do not reflect the 
truth and that Al Hakam was the key to Iraq’s BW program. Mass production of anthrax 
was started there in 1989. Eventually, 8500 liters of liquid with an anthrax spore were 
produced, and most was used to fill weapons.81 Iraq later admitted to Rolf Ekeus that it 
had produced half a million liters of botulinum toxin and anthrax and that research on 
mycotoxins had begun. Iraqis, upon the pressure of UNSCOM, admitted that Al Hakam 
was the site of a plant, producing agents for biological warfare. This was shortly before 
the defection of Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law Lt. General Hussein Kamel Hassan, notes 
Venter. Hassan provided information about 25 warheads, 16 of which were filled with 
botulinum toxin, 5 with anthrax and 4 with aflatoxin. By his own account, there were 
enough of the first two agents, under optimum conditions, to kill a million people.82 
UNSCOM’s subsequent disclosures in Iraq revealed those missiles General Hassan 
mentioned. They were hidden in railway and irrigation tunnels or buried on the banks of 
the Tigris River to protect them from bombing raids. Later, Iraqis claimed that all of them 
were transported to a desert site called Nebai and destroyed.83 The UN officials expressed 
doubts that this was realised. Therefore, Iraq may still have ballistic missiles weaponised 
with bioagents. The Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency both 
reported that during the Gulf War, original photos of Su-22 Sukhoi aircraft taken by the 
US paved the way to think about a possible biochemical spray tank because the photo 
shoved an air scoop on the top front of the tank. There are also reports that a Mirage F1 at 
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Kut Air Force Base of Iraq existed during the Gulf War with belly-drop tanks, which 
could carry 2,000 liters of biological media.84 
In a publication of World Health Organisation (WHO) in 1970, an idea of the 
damage that might be caused by one aircraft spraying a single biological agent is given. If 
dried anthrax of 50 kgs is sprayed in a suitable aerosolized from, it would affect an area 
in excess of 40 sq. kms, it states. 85 It is instructive that British germ warfare experiments 
in 1942 with anthrax on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland caused the place to be 
evacuated for more than 40 years. Tests conducted in 1981 showed that anthrax spores 
were still detected in 20 out of 153 soil samples most of which were embedded to three 
inches in the ground. 
Other UNSCOM work revealed that Salman Pak, an average-sized site, about 40 
km. out of Baghdad were among places where various biological warfare studies 
occurred. Anthrax, botulinum toxin, gas gangrene and fungal toxins were among tasks 
performed at Salman Pak.86 
 
2.1 Past and Recent Developments Regarding Iraq 
2.1.6 Iraqi Delivery Systems 
Prior to the Gulf War Iraq had extensive delivery systems incorporating long-
range strike aircraft with refueling capabilities and several hundred long-range Scud 
missiles, some with chemical warheads. These included Tu-16 and Tu-22 bombers, MIG-
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26 fighters; Mirage F-1,MIG-23 BM, and Su-22 fighter attack aircraft and a Scud force 
with a minumum of 819 missiles. These ballistic missiles included extended range ‘Al 
Husayn’ variants (600 kilometer range) extensively deployed throughout Iraq. Iraq was 
developing ‘Al-Abbas’ missiles (900 kilometer range) which could reach targets in Iran, 
the Persian Gulf, Israel, Turkey, and Cyprus. What is more, Iraqi attempts to develop 
weapon systems comprised also of long-range super guns with ranges of up to 600 
kilometers. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq also engaged in efforts aimed at developing ‘the 
Tammuz’ liquid fueled missile with a range of over 2,000 kilometers.87  
After the Gulf War, UNSCOM verified Iraqi unilateral destruction of 83 missiles 
and 9 mobile launchers. UNSCOM also supervised the destruction of 48 operational 
missiles, 14 conventional missile warheads, 30 missile chemical warheads, other missile 
support equipment and materials, and a variety of assembled and non-assembled 
supergun components. The entire Al-Hakam biological weapons production facility and a 
variety of production equipment for missiles were also among the facilities and 
equipment-destroyed. 
UNSCOM reports point out that it is accountable for 817 of the 819 missiles that 
Iraq imported in the period ending in 1988.88Iraq maintains that it has a stockpile of HY-
2,SS-N-2, and C-601 cruise missiles which are unaffected by UN cease-fire terms. Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reports that US experts believe Iraq may 
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still have components for several dozen extended-range Scud missiles. If it is the case, 
Iraq may target Turkey in the near future owing to the extended-ranges of Al-Abbas-type 
missiles. 89 Iraq has admitted hiding its capability to manufacture its own Scuds, and 
developing an extended range variant of the FROG-7 called ‘the Laith’. Iraq has also 
admitted experimenting with cruise missile technology and ballistic missile designs with 
ranges up to 3,000 kilometers. 
A critically important project Iraq conducted was ‘Project 144’ in which Iraqis 
tried to develop biological warheads for the Al Husayn missile. They also successfully 
developed and tested a warhead separation system. Another means of delivery that was 
under study was the research into the development of remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) 
for the dissemination of biological agents. 90 All these Iraqi endeavours are crucial 
because Iraqi administration is successful in its attempts to deny their capabilities. They 
were reported to be increasingly uncooperative in response to UNSCOM’s effort to 
establish a record of Iraq’s past ballistic missile programs. In November 1996, Howard 
Diamond reports, Iraq refused to permit UNSCOM to take 150 destroyed missile engines, 
which Baghdad claims it destroyed and buried in the summer of 1991. 91 UNSCOM 
inspectors were unable to verify that they were destroyed. Furthermore, former 
UNSCOM Head Rolf Ekeus stated, on February 1999, that Iraq has managed to retain an 
operational force of ballistic missiles in violation of UN prohibitions against possessing 
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such weapons with ranges above 150 kilometers. 92 He pointed out that UNSCOM has 
long suspected Iraq of possessing missile capabilities beyond those permitted under 
UNSCR 687. Ekeus’ assessment indicates that Baghdad may have an operational force of 
between 18 and 25 Scud and Scud variant missiles. 
 
IRAQI MISSILE STOCKPILE 
 
Designations Propellant Range Status 
Al Fahd 500 Solid+liquid 500 km Destroyed 
Badr-2000 Project 395 Solid ---- Destroyed 
Project 144 Project 1728 Liquid 2,000 km Destroyed 
Tammuz-1 Liquid 2,000 km Destroyed 
Al Abid      Tammuz-2 Liquid 3,000 km Destroyed 
Ababil-100 Liquid 100-150 km/300 kg Development 
Al Samoud Liquid 150 km/300 kg Tested/Development 
Scud-B Liquid 300 km/1,000 kg Destroyed 
Al Hussein Liquid 600-650 km/500 kg Destroyed 
Al Abbas Liquid 900 km/300 kg Destroyed 
 
 
2.2 Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
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It is becoming progressively easier to produce WMD without extensive imports 
due to the fact that petrochemical and industrial plants along with the insecticide plants 
steadily extended to the region in general. Dual-use technology is the foremost advantage 
of proliferators enabling them to implement simulated tests, carry out weapons designs 
and manufacture. It appears that IAEA inspections can help prevent these efforts, but can 
also help disguise proliferation if 93+2 regime (the new inspection procedures) and 
methods such as environmental sampling and surprise inspections will not work.93 The 
BTWC has no enforcement provisions and prospects for establishing them in the Middle 
East are not encouraging at all94. Advances in biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals may 
give Iran, Iraq, and Syria the ability to mass-produce “dry storage BW” in aerosol form95. 
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is influential in slowing the spread of 
missiles, but it is not a panacea for the lure of missiles. All three states (Iraq, Iran and 
Syria) have long-range strike aircraft and unconventional delivery options. They all know 
that there is a need to purify and stabilise mustard and nerve agents to acquire lethal 
warhead technology. They all have nerve gas technology. 
Notwithstanding President Khatemi’s moderation of the regime’s anti-Western 
position and rhetoric, Iran is still one of the most active countries seeking to obtain 
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CBRN and missile technologies96. Although Iran acceded to the NPT, and signed the 
CTBT, its main drive for nuclear related equipment, material and know-how continues. 
Such programs are continuing with support from Russia, North Korea and China97. Iran 
pursues independent production capability for its weapons programs, and made 
outstanding progress among other Middle Eastern states in regard with chemical, 
biological and ballistic missile development programs. Iran disclosed its effort through 
public displays of missiles and declarations on them98. In July and September 2000, flight 
tests of the Shahab-3 reflected Iran’s intent to project military influence throughout the 
region99. Iran’s defense budget, like many other Middle East countries, has priority in its 
oil-based economy. It is estimated to be $6 billion for the fiscal year of 20 March 2001, 3 
percent of its GDP.  
 
2.2 Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.2.1 Iranian Endeavors to Proliferate 
It is asserted that Iran seeks to obtain whole facilities that could be used to 
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produce fissile materials for a nuclear weapon100. Fissile materials are potentially 
available in black market that is one of the ways Iran may choose. Iran’s rhetoric is that it 
has a vital need to establish a nuclear fuel cycle for its civilian energy program. However, 
it does not seem to be plausible given that Iran has vast reserves of natural gas and oil 
enough for the long foreseeable future101. Seemingly, this is still one of the methods of 
acquiring fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Another option for a weapon acquisition 
is stealing it from the former Soviet Russian territories.  
Iran is claimed to be seeking fissile material and related nuclear technology for 
weapons development, especially from sources in Russia102. Russian Federation is 
continuing to work on a 1,000-megawatt power reactor at Bushehr and Bushehr will fall 
under IAEA safeguards. Nevertheless, Iran may use this project to have access to more 
sensitive nuclear technologies from Russia and to develop their expertise on the field. In 
that guise, it may strengthen its nuclear infrastructure, which would in turn be supporting 
nuclear weapons research and development. China has been another major supplier of 
nuclear-related facilities and technology. It has undertaken three projects with Iran, a 
small research reactor and a zirconium production facility, and finally a uranium 
conversion project. This project could give Iran the means to produce uranium 
hexafluoride or uranium dioxide, which are feedstocks for manufacturing weapons grade 
plutonium. China pledged that it would stop these projects and announced new export 
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controls covering dual-use nuclear equipment.  
Iran is also believed to be pursuing biological warfare capabilities103. It may have 
small quantities of usable agents. Iran ratified the BTWC. As for the chemical program, 
Iran began chemical warfare program during Iran-Iraq war, and, although poorly known 
it employed limited amounts of agent against Iraqi troops104. It has weaponized stockpile 
of agents, is capable of agent delivery and trains military forces to operate in 
contaminated environment. In short, Iran seems to be capable of conducting a chemical 
warfare. It ratified the CWC and made declarations on it. 
 
2.2 Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.2.2 Iranian Missile Program and Other Means of WMD Delivery 
Iran is producing Scuds like Syria does; its ballistic missile force comprises of 
SCUD-B, SCUD-C and Chinese-made CSS-8 SRBMS. Its main effort is to mass-produce 
Shahab-3 MRBM that is allegedly based on North Korean No Dong105. This effort is 
estimated to involve huge Russian and Chinese assistance106. Persians also declared that 
they are trying to enhance the range and envision adding Shahab-4 and Shahab-5 to their 
arsenal.107 In addition to the ballistic missiles, Iran has other means of delivery available 
such as land- sea- and air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles and air launched tactical 
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missiles. If one day they have nuclear warheads loaded on ballistic missiles, then 
certainly they will have the means with which they can deter or intimidate their 
neighbours. 
Iran has increased emphasis on its ballistic missile program. Currently, it has 
several hundred SCUD-Bs and SCUD-Cs and Chinese-made CSS-8 (Short-range ballistic 
missiles) SRBMs. Having received production assistance from North Korea, it is reported 
to be now producing SCUD missiles108. In recent years, Russian and Chinese entities are 
reported to have supplied a wide variety of missile-related goods, technology and 
expertise to Iran109. It is maintained that Iran's potential to be a supplier is gradually 
increasing. Its recent efforts have been on the development of the 1300 kilometer range 
Shahab-3 missile which is estimated to be based on the North Korean No Dong. Iran 
flight-tested the Shahab-3 in July 1998, and July and September 2000. At this time, Iran 
likely has the capability to deploy limited numbers of Shahab-3. It has publicly displayed 
prototypes of this MRBM and may have an emergency operational capability for it. 
Robert Walpole argues that Tehran probably has a small number of Shahab-3 s available 
for use in a conflict and it has announced that production and deployment has begun. 
Shahab-3 is a medium-range ballistic missile which will allow Iran to reach Israel, most 
of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. That is, it could deploy a limited number of the missiles 
during a perceived crisis. Hence, it is unlikely for the Turkish army to involve in a 
Kardak/Imia-like rapidly escalating crisis when confronted with Iran. In July 2000, prior 
to the missile’s second test flight, the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps 
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stated that Iran had formed Shahab-3 units and built launching pads for the missiles110. 
While this may overstate and exaggerate Iran’s current capabilities, it clearly illustrates 
Iran’s intent. 
Though later it has been categorized as a space launch vehicle with no military 
applications, Iran’s Defense Minister publicly acknowledged the development of the 
Shahab-4, and has also mentioned plans for a Shahab-5, which may be an 
(Intercontinental ballistic missile) ICBM, or a space launch vehicle (SLV)111. 
 
Such statements together with the sustained cooperation with Russia, North Korea 
and China suggest that Tehran may intend to develop and deploy a longer-range ballistic 
missile capability. In addition, Iran may have an ICBM ambition. Testing a space launch 
vehicle is almost synonymous with ICBM ability, and Iran is estimated to have it within 
the next 15 years112.  
 
Iran has purchased land-, sea-, and air-launched short-range cruise missiles from 
China113. It possesses numerous foreign-made air-launched short-range tactical missiles, 
which are potential means of delivery for CBRN weapons. Many of these weapon 
systems are deployed as anti-ship weapons in or near the Persian Gulf. Tehran could try 
to purchase land attack cruise missiles to complement its ballistic missile force. Iran has 
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also a variety of fighter aircraft, artillery, and rockets available as other potential means 
of delivery for CBRN weapons114. 
Iran’s air delivery systems include SU-24 long-range strike fighters with ranges 
and payloads almost equivalent to US F-111 and F-4D/E fighter-bombers with capability 
to carry huge payloads to ranges of 450 miles. It can modify HY-2 silkworm missiles and 
SA-2 surface-to-air missiles to deliver WMD115. ‘The Iran-130’ or ‘Nazeat’ is available 
since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. It is a solid fuel rocket with a simple inertial guidance 
system to reach ranges of about 90-120 kilometers. ‘The Shahin’ which can be equipped 
with three types of warheads is being developed116. It can be equipped with a 180-
kilogram high explosive warhead, warheads using high explosive submunitions, and a 
warhead of chemical agents. Finally, Iran has Oghab (Eagle) rocket with 40 kilometers 
range. It has large numbers of multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery for short-range 
delivery of chemical weapons. 
 
In 1990, as shorter missile range systems, Iran bought CSS-8 surface-to-surface 
missiles (converted SA-2s) from China with ranges of 130-150 kilometers. It has Chinese 
sea and land based anti-ship cruise missiles with which Iran hit one US-flagged tanker, 
and fired 10 such missiles at Kuwait during Iran-Iraq War.117 The Soviet designed SCUD 
B (17E) guided missile forms the core of Iran’s ballistic missile force. Iran possibly 
acquired its Scuds in response to Iraq’s invasion, obtained a limited number from Libya, 
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and then obtained larger numbers from North Korea. It fired its first Scuds in March 
1985. It fired 14 Scuds in 1985, 8 in 1986, 18 in 1987, and 77 in 1988. Iran fired 77 Scud 
missiles during a 52 day period-the war of the cities- in 1988. Sixty-one were fired at 
Baghdad, nine at Mosul, five at Kirkuk, one at Takrit, and one at Kuwait.118 Iran fired as 
many as five missiles on a single day and once fired three missiles within 30 minutes.  
Most estimates indicate that Iran now has 6-12 Scud launchers and up to 200 Scud 
B (R-17E) missiles with 230-310 km. range119. Some estimates give higher figures: They 
estimate that Iran bought 200-300 Scud Bs from North Korea between 1987 and 1992, 
and might have continued to buy such missiles after that time. Some experts also believe 
that Iran can now manufacture all of the Scud Bs, with the exception of the most 
sophisticated components of its guidance system and rocket motors120. This makes it 
difficult to estimate how many missiles Iran has in inventory and can acquire over time, 
as well as to estimate the precise performance characteristics of their missiles since they 
can alter them. They can alter, for instance, the burn time, or the weight of the warhead. 
Iran also has new long-range North Korean Scuds –SCUD Cs-with ranges nearly 500 km. 
Iran probably had more than 60 Scud Cs by 1998. Iran may have 5-10 Scud C launchers, 
each with several missiles.121 
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Iran seems to want enough missiles and launchers to make its missile force highly 
dispersible. Accordingly, there are reports indicating Iran deployed Scud Cs, testing a 
highly dispersed force structure, as part of the exercise Saeqer-3 (Thunderbolt 3). Scud 
Cs are thought to be developed by the North Koreans with the help from China.122 While 
it is often called a ‘Scud C’ it seems to differ very much from the original Soviet Scud B, 
and seems to be based more on the Chinese-made DF-61. The North Korean missiles are 
estimated to have a range around 310 miles (500 km.), a warhead with a high explosive 
payload of 700 kg, and relatively good accuracy and reliability. Although this payload is 
a little bit limited for the delivery of chemical agents, Iran may modify the warhead to 
increase payload at the expense of range restricting the using of chemical munitions to 
the most lethal agents such as persistent nerve gas. Iran might also consider arming its 
Scud C force with biological agents. In any case, these missiles have enough range and 
payload to give Iran the ability to strike all targets on the southern coast of the Gulf and 
all of the populated areas in Iraq123. Iran could also reach targets in part of eastern Syria, 
the eastern third of Turkey, and cover targets in the border area of the former Soviet 
Union, western Afghanistan, and western Pakistan.124 However, accuracy and reliability 
remain big uncertainties, as does circular error probable (CEP). 
Iran is developing an indigenous missile production capability with both solid and 
liquid fueled missiles. One plant is claimed to be located outside Karaj, near Tehran at 
the Defense Technology and Science Research Center, which is a branch of Iran’s 
Defence Industry Organization. Iran’s largest missile assembly and production plant is 
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said to be a North Korean-built facility near Isfahan. Another missile plant is said to be 
located near Semnan, 175 kilometers east of Tehran.125 This plant is supposed to produce 
600-1000 Oghab rockets per year and the Iran-130. Another estimated facility is near 
Bandar Abbas for the assembly of the Seersucker. Anthony Cordesman asserts that there 
have been reports that Iran is developing extended range Scuds with the support of 
Russian experts, and a missile called the Tondar 68 with a range of 700 kilometers. There 
were, Cordesman asserts, many reports during early 1990s that Iran ordered the North 
Korean No Dong missile which was planned to have the capability to carry nuclear and 
biological missiles with ranges of up to 900 kilometers. This range of No Dong would 
allow the missile reach to any target in the Gulf, in Turkey, and Israel.126 However, the 
status of the North Korean No Dong program remains uncertain, as is the case for the No-
Dong 1 and the Taepo Dong 1 and 2. These latter missiles are highly effective on range 
and velocity. Since the early 1990s, Iran is suspected of developing longer-range variants 
of the No Dong for indigenous production with substantial Russian and some Chinese 
help.127 This endeavor is thought to explain the background to Iran’s new Shahab system. 
Shahab missiles included performance similar to those previously identified with Iranian 
missiles adapted from North Korean designs. No Dong has a range of 500 km and No 
Dong 1 has that of 1,000 to 1,300 km. Shahab (meteor) missiles might have been based 
on No Dongs for it is a liquid-fueled missile with a range of 810 miles, roughly the same 
range. Thus it seems logical to argue that Chinese and Russian support is central in 
Iranian pursuit of CBRN. 
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Iran tested the Shahab on July 21 1998 claiming that it was a defensive action to 
deal with potential threats. General Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, Head of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps’ air wing reported on August 2,1998 that the Shahab-3 is a 
very accurate weapon.128 President Mohammad Khatami on August 1, 1998 stated that 
Iran was determined to continue to strengthen its armed forces, regardless of international 
concerns: “Iran will not seek permission from anyone for strengthening its defense 
capability.”129 
Iran publicly displayed the Shahab-3 on its launcher during a parade on 
September 25, 1998, the missile carrier bore signs saying “The US can do nothing” and 
“Israel would be wiped from the map.” The Shahab was tested in a launch from a 
transport-erector-launcher (TEL) from a new air base at Mashad on February 20, 2000, 
and successfully demonstrated the integration of the engine and missile subsystems. 
Iran’s third test came again in 2000, in July. Jane’s Defense Weekly claimed that Israeli 
officials and US believe that the Shahab-3 was now ready for deployment.130 Iran’s 
Defence Minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani has said a larger missile, Shahab-4, was in 
production as a vehicle for launching satellites into space. Israel’s army chief, Lieutenant-
General Shaul Mofaz, told Israel Radio that combined development of the missile and a 
non-conventional capacity posed a threat not only to Israel, but also any country within 
range of the missile. What is more, Iran tested a solid-state missile it called the Shahab-D 
on September 20,2000. Iran also successfully test-fired an anti-armor missile capable of 
destroying the most sophisticated armoured equipment on 31 July 2001. Iranian News 
Agency stated that the test-fire of Sa’eqeh (Lightning) missile as proof of Iran’s ceaseless 
                                                 
128 Cordesman, op. cit, 2001, p.56 
129 Cordesman, op cit, 2001, p.54 
 53
efforts made by the aerospace industry exports to embark on an ambitious arms 
programme. The Iranian Deputy Defense minister claimed that it was part of a peaceful 
program for launching satellites.131 In spite of these developments, a number of US 
intelligence officials state that the reports were politicized by pressure from the policy 
level to support the NMD program. They claim that Iran still faces problems in its 
program to build Shahab-3.132 At least one official has been quoted as stating that, “There 
is an Iranian threat to US forces in the region, not to the continental United 
States.”133Other US officials agree that Iran is considering developing a rocket that can 
put satellites in orbit, and note that the development of such a booster would give Iran the 
capability to develop an ICBM.134  
The timing of a MRBM such as Shahab-3 entails skill, as does effective 
deployment. It is still unclear when Iran will be able to bring such considerations to the 
final development stage. It has to carry out a full range of suitable test firings, develop 
highly lethal warheads and deploy actual units for them. Much still seems to depend on 
the level of foreign assistance. There have been reports that Iran might be using Russian 
technology to develop long-range missiles with ranges from 2000 to 6250 kilometers. 
The Shahab-4, with a range of 2000 kilometers (1250 miles) is said to be based on the 
SS-4. SS-4 (R-12 or Sandal) is an aging Russian liquid-fuel missile. Besides, in 1998, 
Iran is reported to have carried out the test of a sea-launched ballistic missile.135 
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2.2 Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.2.3 Russian-Iranian Relations 
The Russian firm, the Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute has provided 
Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) with wind tunnels for missile design, 
equipment for manufacturing missile models, and the software for testing launch and 
reentry performance. Rosvoorouzheine, a major Russian arms-export agency; NPO Trud, 
a rocket motor manufacturer; a leading research center called the Bauman Institute, and 
Polyus (Northstar), a major laser test and manufacturing equipment firm are also reported 
to be involved in transactions with Iran.136  
They could play a major role in helping Iran develop longe-range versions of 
SCUD B and C, and more accurate variations of a missile similar to the No Dong. The 
Israeli press reported in August 1997 that Israel had evidence that Iran was receiving 
Russian support. In September 1997 Israel leaked such evidence indicating private and 
state-owned Russian firms provided gyroscopes, electronic components, wind tunnels, 
guidance and propulsion systems, and the components needed to build such systems to 
Iran. It is noted that President Yeltsin, although initially denied such charges, later agreed 
that head of the Russian space program should examine the US intelligence and draft a 
report on Russian transfers to Iran. This report reached a very different conclusion that 
Russia provided such aid to Iran. Iranians were also found to be studying rocket 
engineering at the Baltic State University in St. Petersburg and the Bauman State 
University.137 
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The Russian Scientific and Production Center INOR concluded an agreement in 
September 1997 to sell Iran 620 kg. of special alloy called 21 HKMT, and provide Iran 
with the capability to thermally treat the alloy for missile bodies. INOR was also selling 
alloy foils in sheets 0.2-0.4 millimetres thick for the outer body of missiles. INOR had 
also brokered deals with the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group in Iran to supply steel for 
missile cases, composite graphite-tungsten materials, laser equipment, and special mirrors 
used in missile tests. In 1998, the US made an indirect threat that the Congress might 
apply sanctions. There had been high-level talks, and end result was an agreement by 
then-Vice President Gore and then-President Chernomyrdin to strengthen controls over 
transfer technology. It is now not clear whether it put an end to the problem. After the 
agreement, in 1998 the State Department declared 20 Russian agencies and research 
facilities were enlisted because of their role in transferring missile technology to Iran. 
Same year saw new arrests of smugglers attempting to ship 22 tons of specialized steel to 
Iran via Azerbaijan using Russian corporations as a cover.138 
Reports on Chinese transfers of ballistic missile technology provide less detail. 
Iran placed orders for Chinese-made M-9 (CSS-6 / DF-15) missile which is of 280-620 
km. range. Chinese firms are likely to give assistance in developing indigenous missile 
R&D and production facilities for the production of an Iranian solid fueled missile. Iran 
possibly has acquired much of the technology essential to build long-range cruise missile 
systems from China. Cruise missiles cost only 10% to 25% as much as ballistic missiles 
of similar range; HY-2 and Seersucker and CS-802 can be modified quickly for land 
attacks against area targets. Some reports indicate that China is helping Iran build copies 
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of the Chinese CS-801/CS-802 and the Chinese FL-2 or F-7 anti-ship cruise missiles.139 
As a result, Iran may be seeking anti-ship capabilities in addition to platforms for 
delivering WMD. Aircraft or ships could launch cruise missiles with chemical or 
biological warheads from outside the normal defense perimeter of the Southern Gulf 
states. Building an entire cruise missile would be difficult. The technology for fusing 
CBW and cluster warheads is said to be within Iran’s grasp, but navigation systems and 
jet engines are argued to be still a problem.140 Complex inertial navigation systems (INS), 
global positioning systems (GPS), or radar altimeters are not easy systems to build. There 
are commercially available gas turbine engines necessary for use in a cruise missile. Still, 
it is difficult to find a reliable and efficient turbofan engine for a specific design 
application. There are over 20 countries with the necessary design and manufacturing 
skills. 
The CIA reported in January 1999 that entities in Russia and China continue to 
supply missile-related goods and technology to Iran.141 Tehran is probably using these 
goods and technologies to achieve its aim of becoming a self-sufficient producer. 
Shahab-3 MRBM demonstrates the success it has been achieving in realising that goal. 
Iran is already producing Scud SRBMs with North Korean help and has begun 
production of the Shahab-3, and is working on the development of the Shahab-4 ballistic 
missile with a longer range.142  
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Apart from China and Russia, North Korea is a significant supplier to the Middle 
East and to Iran in particular. Throughout the second half of 1999, North Korea continued 
to export many ballistic missile-related equipments and missile components, materials 
and technical expertise. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are one of 
North’s Korea’s major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued missile 
development and production.143 
 
2.2 Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.2.4 Iran’s Chemical Weapons Development Program 
Iran has acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and 
acknowledged the existence of a past chemical weapons program. It admitted developing 
a CW program during the latter stages of Iran-Iraq war as a deterrent against Iraq’s use of 
chemical agents against Iran.144Iran developed the capability to produce enough lethal 
agents to load its own weapons. It produced blood agents like hydrogen cyanide, 
phosgene gas, and chlorine gas. Blister agents (sulfur mustard) were among the agents 
that were loaded into bombs and artillery shells and were used occasionally against Iraq 
in 1987.145 It is argued that because the Western world just watched what Iraqis did 
during the First Gulf War, Iran regarded CW as poor man’s atomic bombs. In late 1988, 
Rafsanjani described CW as: “Chemical and biological weapons are poor man’s atomic 
bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them for our defense. 
Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that international laws 
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are only scraps of paper”. 146Though CW production estimates are uncertain, production 
of nerve gas weapons are guessed to get started no later than 1994. Furthermore, weapons 
include bombs and artillery. It may have developmental chemical warheads for its Scuds. 
It might have deployed chemical weapons on some of its ships. Iran reportedly placed 
several orders from China. Razak Industries in Tehran, and chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries in Tabriz ordered 49 metric tons of alkyl dimethylamine and 17 tons of sodium 
sulfide, chemicals used in making mustard gas. The orders were never delivered.147 Iran's 
International Movalled Industries Corporation (Imaco) and China's North Chemical 
Industries Co. (Nocinco) brokered them. Both Imaco and Nocinco have been involved 
transactions affecting Iran’s chemical weapons program since 1995. Nocinco has 
supplied Iran with several hundred tons of carbon disulfide, a chemical used in nerve gas. 
According to (Directorate of Central Intelligence) DCI Non-proliferation Center reports 
of February 2000 Iran has already manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons 
including blister, blood and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for 
delivering them.148 Cordesman underscores the role of Western countries as important 
sources for WMD-related goods and materials; spare parts for dual-use equipment, 
scientific equipment, and special metals were the most common items sought.149 
 
2.2 Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.2.5 Iran’s Biological Weapons Development Program 
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Iran has a growing biotechnology industry, significant pharmaceutical experience 
and an infrastructure to support its biological warfare program.150 Outside assistance is 
crucial for Tehran and difficult to bar because of the dual-use nature of the materials and 
equipment pursued by Iran. These materials have many legitimate end uses for the 
civilian sectors. Iran’s biological warfare program began during the Iran-Iraq war, and 
Tehran, as a nation labeled as a rogue state, is believed to be pursuing offensive 
biological weapons. It is estimated that it is beyond the R&D stage, producing small 
quantities of agent. Iran has ratified BTWC. Tehran’s weapons effort was first 
documented in 1982. Having imported suitable types of cultures from Europe, it was 
working on the production of mycotoxins.151 In 1989, it was trying to obtain new strains 
of fungus from Canada and Netherlands that can be used to produce mycotoxins. German 
sources indicated that they purchased such cultures several years earlier.152 The Imam 
Reza Medical Center at Mashdad Medical Sciences University and the Iranian Research 
Organization for Science and Technology are under suspect. Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran 
has conducted research on lethal agents like anthrax, hoof and mouth disease and 
biotoxins. Iranian groups have periodically approached European firms for the provision 
of equipment and technology needed for such agents. The CIA Report 2000 report 
underlines the possible limited capability of Iran for BW deployment.153 Russian entities 
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remain a significant source of biotechnology and chemicals for Tehran. As a consequence 
of all, it is likely to conclude that Iran has some capacity of deployment of a few agents.  
 
2.2 Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.2.6 Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Development Program 
Iran’s nuclear history goes back to the Shah’s period. The Shah established the 
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in 1974, and began to negotiate for nuclear power 
plants. He concluded an extendible ten-year nuclear fuel contract with the US in 1974, 
with Germany in 1976, and France in 1977. In 1975, he purchased a 10% share in a 
Eurodif uranium enrichment in France that was part of a French, Belgian, Spanish and 
Italian consortium. He created an ambitious plan calling for a network of 23 power 
reactors throughout Iran that was to be operating by the mid-1990s, and sought to buy 
nuclear power plants from Germany and France. By the time the Shah fell in January 
1979, he had six reactors under contract. Two 1,300-megawatt German nuclear power 
plants at Bushehr were already 60% and 75% completed. US experts believed Shah 
began a low-level nuclear weapons research program including weapon designs and 
plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel. Iran also tried to purchase 26.2 kg. of HEU, 
the application to the US was pending when the Shah fell. The program also included a 
laser enrichment program, which began in 1975 leading to an illegal effort to acquire 
laser separation technology from the US.154  
In 1976 Iran signed a secret contract to buy $70 million worth of yellow cake 
from South Africa and appears to have reached an agreement to buy 1,000 metric tons a 
year. It is unclear how much of this ore South Africa shipped before it agreed to adopt 
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IAEA export restrictions in 1984.155 Before his death the Shah accepted full IAEA 
safeguards. In 1984, Khomeini revived nuclear weapons program begun under the Shah. 
Iran received remarkable West German and Argentine corporate support with regard to 
nuclear technology during the Iran-Iraq War. Possible limited transfers of centrifuge and 
other weapons related technology took place from China and possibly Pakistan. Iran has a 
Chinese-supplied heavy water, zero-power research reactor at Isfahan Nuclear Research 
Center, and two-Chinese supplied sub-critical assemblies, a light water reactor and 
graphite design facility. It has stockpiles of uranium and mines in Yazd area. It is 
suspected to have had a uranium-ore concentration facility at the University of Tehran. 
When it tried to complete Bushehr I and II located in on the Gulf Coast, (southwest of 
Isfahan) with the German and Argentine support, Iraqis damaged the reactors by air 
strikes in 1987 and 1988. Iran may have begun to exploit yellow case stocks that the Shah 
obtained from South Africa in the late 1970s.It is stated that the Khomeini government 
may have obtained several thousands pounds of uranium dioxide from Argentina by 
purchasing it through Algeria. Uranium dioxide is considerably more refined than yellow 
cake, and is easier to use in irradiating material in a reactor to produce plutonium.156 
The status of Iran’s nuclear program since the Iran-Iraq War is highly 
controversial, and Iran denies the existence of such a program. However, Iran’s Deputy 
President Ayatollah Mohajerani stated in October 1991 that Iran should work with other 
Islamic states to create an Islamic bomb157. Rafsanjani when asked if Iran had a nuclear 
weapons program in an interview in the CBS program 60 minutes in 1997, replied, 
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“Definitely not. I hate this weapon.” Other senior leaders including President Khatami 
and foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi stated on October 5,1997 that they are not 
developing an atomic bomb, because they do not believe it. The only reason for, they 
state, pursuing nuclear technology is to have an energy source other than their oil and gas 
reserves. They argue that like US, Iran can also have civilian nuclear energy programs in 
case their energy reserves of oil and gas will finish in a few decades. They assert that 
nuclear technology has peaceful purposes, utilities in medicine and agriculture.158 
The IAEA reports that Iran has fully complied with its present requirements, and 
that it has not found indications of any nuclear weapons effort, but IAEA only inspects 
Iran’s small research reactors. It is asserted that the IAEA visits to other Iranian sites are 
not inspections.159 They do not use instruments or cameras, but just walk-throughs. IAEA 
visited five suspect Iranian sites in 1992 and 1993 in this manner, but did not conduct full 
inspections.160 Iran has not had any 93+2 inspections and their position seems 
diplomatical, that they will not be either the first or the last to have them. Iran attempted 
to buy highly enriched (HEU) uranium from Kazakhstan. The US bought the huge 
amount-1,300 pounds HEU that Iran desired-from Ust-Kamenogorsk facility in 
Kazakhstan. Iran has also imported maraging steel, used for centrifuges, by smuggling it 
through dummy fronts. 
In May 1987, Argentina agreed to train Iranian technicians at its Jose Balaseiro 
Nuclear Institute, and sold Iran $5.5 million worth of uranium for its Amirabad Nuclear 
Research Center reactor. Argentina agreed to provide Iran with HEU and possibly 
uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology as well. Change in 
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government in 1992 cancelled the $18 million nuclear technology sale to Iran putting fore 
the reason that Iran had not signed a nuclear safeguards arrangement. Argentine press 
sources suggested, however, Argentina was reacting to US pressure.161 
Spanish, German and Czech help was sought by Iran so as to complete the two 
power plants at Bushehr. Associated Enterprises of Spain and another two ENUSA and 
Kraftwerke Union were involved in negotiations. A 10-man delegation from Iran’s 
Ministry of Industry was in Madrid negotiating with the Director of Associated 
Enterprises, Adolofo Garcia Rodriguez. These negotiations occurred in late 1980s and 
early 1990s.162 It is reasonable to argue that Iran intensified its efforts to develop a 
nuclear weapons program after the lessons of the Gulf War. It was obvious after the Gulf 
Wars that missiles and WMD may well be used in the future, either to attack or as a 
response to attempts at intimidating.  
Iran reportedly tried to import reactor parts from Siemens in Germany and Skoda 
in Czechoslovakia.163 None of these efforts solved Iran’s problems in rebuilding its 
reactor program, but all these demonstrate the depth of its interest. In 1992, Iran 
attempted to buy beryllium from a storage site in Kazakhstan that had also 600 kg. of 
HEU. Later on, in 1994, the US bought the material getting it out of the country. In July 
1996 British customs officials seized 110 pounds of maraging steel being shipped to 
Iran.164 
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Iran continues to operate an Argentine-fueled five-megawatt light water HEU 
reactor at the University of Tehran. It may be useful in experimenting with nuclear 
weapons designs. The Center has experimented with a heavy water zero-power reactor, a 
light water sub-critical reactor, and a graphite sub-critical reactor. Experts state that with 
the Iranian present reactors, although they are scarcely ideal for irradiating material to 
produce plutonium, Iran has the technology base to make its own reactors.165 Russia has 
agreed to build up four reactors, beginning with a complex at Bushehr, with two 1,000-
1,200 megawatt reactors and two 465-megawatt reactors, and thereby pledging 
considerable nuclear technology and expertise. Russian Federation was about to sell a 
centrifuge plant to Iran in April 1995. It was curtailed only by the US endeavors at the 
presidential level. What’s more another possible supplier is Ukraine. The US persuaded 
Ukraine not to sell Iran $45 million worth of turbines for its nuclear plant in early March 
1998 and to strengthen its controls on Ukrainian missile technology under the MTCR.166 
Seemingly there is an urgent need to better the monitoring of Russian, Ukrainian 
Western and newly independent states' contacts to Iran. With respect to Iran’s nuclear 
infrastructure, these states’, and especially Russian assistance can enhance Iran’s ability 
to sustain a nuclear weapons development effort. The control of fissile material in the 
former Soviet Union territories remains a vital problem for the nonproliferation regime. 
Soviet Russia left a nuclear legacy of some 1,485 tons of fissile material. These include 
770 tons in some 27,000 weapons, including 816 strategic bombs, 5434 missile warheads, 
and about 20,000 theater and tactical weapons. In addition to that, there large numbers of 
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experienced technicians in the Russian weapons design center at Arzamas, and in nuclear 
production complexes in Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk and Tomsk.167  
The CIA warned in January 2000 that Russia might have sold Iran heavy water 
and graphite technology. The Jerusalem Post, on April 9, 1998 reported that Iran had 
purchased four tactical nuclear weapons from Russian smugglers for $25 million in the 
early 1990s, that the weapons were obtained from Kazakhstan in 1991, and that 
Argentine technicians were helping to activate the weapon.168 
In early 1990s, China was reported to have agreed to provide significant nuclear 
technology transfer and possible sale of two 300 megawatt pressurized water reactors. It 
reportedly gave up such endeavors after pressure from the U.S. On November 4, 1991, 
China stated that it had signed commercial cooperation agreements with Iran, and that it 
would transfer an electromagnetic isotope separator (calutron) and a small nuclear 
reactor, for peaceful and commercial purposes. These had no value in producing fissile 
material, but gave Iran knowledge of reactor and enrichment technology, and China may 
have provided Iran with data on chemical separation, other enrichment technology, the 
design for facilities to convert uranium hexaflouride to make reactor fuel and help in 
processing yellow cake. China pledged in October 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear 
cooperation with Iran.169 The pledge appears to be holding according to the analysts and 
certain intelligence services. As a party to the NPT, Iran is required to apply IAEA 
safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards are not required for the zirconium plant or its 
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products. In March, the US found that China Nuclear Energy Corporation was 
negotiating to sell Iran several hundred tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) to 
Isfahan Nuclear Research Corporation in central Iran, a site where some experts believe 
Iran is working on the development of nuclear weapons.170 AHF can be used to separate 
plutonium, help refine yellow cake into uranium hexaflouride to produce U-235, and as a 
feedstock for sarin. Chinese authorities are said to have provided a variety of missile-
related items and assistance to several countries of proliferation concern. One of the 
allegations is that China continued to work on one of its remaining projects, supplying 
Iran’s civil nuclear program with a zirconium production facility. This facility can be 
used to produce cladding for reactor fuel, and IAEA safeguards do not comprise the 
zirconium plant and its products.  
There are two important points in considering Iran’s attempts at acquiring nuclear 
military capability. First, the construction of a 1,000 megawatt nuclear power reactor in 
Bushehr. This project will help Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure, which 
in turn will be useful in sustaining nuclear weapons research and development. Second 
issue evolves around the point that whether Iran can buy fissile material. Timing of 
weapons acquisition depends heavily on whether it can do so. If it had, it would produce 
weapons in not more than 2 years. Otherwise, it has to develop the capability to process 
plutonium or enriched uranium, which means it is likely to take 5-10 years. 
The war maintained a balance of power in the region especially visible between 
Iran and Iraq, the two archenemies. Iran, which was the relatively militarily backward 
state when compared to Iraq in the late 1980s, now has a stronger military stance vis-à-
vis Iraq owing to latter’s devastation in the second Gulf War. Its continued missile 
                                                 
170 Ottenberg, op. cit. p.4 
 67
development efforts reinforced Iran’s military and political deterrent. Even mere 
intelligence that it is actively pursuing WMD and missile capabilities enforces strategists 
and military planners to revise their risk calculus. If we assume that Iran had all the 
sophistication needed to direct and control NBC weapons and missiles, it would have to 
choose among several possible delivery options which are use of strike aircraft, 
saboteurs, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and ballistic and/or converted cruise 
missiles for land attack. But, how frightening or big is the threat? The answer entails 
contemplating three factors: hard technology, soft technology, and vital foreign 
assistance. Iran today is a world leader in the development of large artillery rockets with 
ranges of 40 to 200 km. These are not very effective delivery systems, but their technical 
weakness can be compensated by their low cost and by deploying large numbers or 
arming them with chemical or biological agents.171 
Nevertheless, even the largest artillery rockets do not have ‘strategic value’ 
despite their splendid ‘tactical potential’. It is a concern for Iraq, but not for Turkey. Iran 
has to master the specifications of solid motors, solid fuels and fuel grains, which require 
huge chemical and manufacturing finesse. It is pointed out that even the suppliers of Iran 
(China and Russia) required more than 25 years to master that technology.172 
Scud development was a good route for Iranian proliferation efforts. The Scud 
missiles can be reverse engineered for production and easily stretched to ranges of 1,000 
km, but experts underline this issue as one of the many enigmas of Iranian rocketry. 
Iranians always failed to use this Scud production capability. The most likely explanation 
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is that essential manufacturing materials cannot be supplied by any other state such as 
North Korea or Russia. 
With less probability than its ballistic missiles, Iran has been at the forefront of 
Middle Eastern efforts to develop cruise missiles. However, its efforts are restrained by 
lack of advanced technology, weak aerodynamic infrastructure and a low funding 
priority. The Chinese Silkworm and its Russian counterpart the Styx are to cruise missiles 
what the Scud is to ballistic missiles: cheap, easily reverse-engineered, and well suited to 
modification and mass production.173 
Lack of advanced technology appears as the inability to produce and control 
follow-on systems and guidance systems regarding the cruise efforts. Without massive 
foreign assistance, it is estimated that Iran will not be able to develop a new generation 
cruise missile within the next 15 years.174 A new generation of cruise missiles could 
overcome the range problem associated with the Scuds, by giving any state weapons 
effective to ranges of 600 to 800 km. If the enlisted obstacles are eliminated, cruise 
missiles are advantageous for Iran because of their lower cost, greater accuracy and more 
effective delivery of chemical and biological warheads. Turning back to the ballistic 
missiles, Shahab-3 is a domestic Iranian design, but with much foreign assistance to its 
fuel casting, casing and nozzle fabrication. Neither of the Shahab programs (Shahab-3 or 
Shahab-4) is being managed like the systemic procurements programs of the US or the 
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NATO. They appear to be motivated by a general Iranian desire to have long-range 
ballistic missile.175  
Many experts evaluate the Shahab development program as a low-risk creating 
one and do not regard any successful Shahab-4 deployment plausible before eight years 
time.176 Even if Iranians solved the propulsion problems, they would experience big 
problems with the guidance systems. Furthermore, there are warhead problems, which are 
much harder to overcome. Unless Iranian nuclear program receives massive foreign 
assistance, including the import of fissile material, Iran must rely on conventional 
explosives or CBW for many years. Iran probably experiments with chemical warheads 
for its Scuds, but their effectiveness is difficult to test and unknown until actual use. 
Another limitation comes with the re-entry vehicles. Unless Iran has a foreign-made 
system, the range of its MRBMs will be limited to nearly 1,000 to 1,200 km. Greater 
ranges entail higher re-entry speeds and more developed heating systems which Iran is 
not capable of creating by itself.177 As for the ICBMs, there are incredible difficulties 
such as engine clustering, multiple staging and systems integration. Above all, Iran needs 
an inertial navigation systems and a highly destructive warhead. Thus, there are great 
difficulties facing Iran in the realm of hard technology. 
 As for ‘the soft technology’, the circumstances are no less discouraging. Soft 
technology comprises decision-making, management expertise, engineering skills and 
finance. It is this very realm that blocks and frustrates Iranian authorities’ nuclear and 
missile ambitions. There is a poor decision-making, which is the linchpin of the 
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development programs. Iranian political leaders have been unable to reach to a consensus 
in channeling the nation’s missile projects. Resources are divided between Pasdaran (the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps), the Army, and the Ministry of Defense. With 
numerous missile projects on-going, no single one is likely to get a concentrated effect. 
According to Aaron Karp, each missile program is the worst enemy of the other. It is 
when Iran is making a choice between them that Turkey should become alarmed. Even if 
the technological aid arrives, lack of skilled personnel makes it hard for Iran to absorb 
that know-how, dual-use materials, missile design and production equipment. It certainly 
has competent engineers, but human resources are weak, technicians are not skilled at the 
down-level chain of command.178 
The final factor in assessing Iranian ballistic missile threat is the foreign 
assistance. This assistance is governed by political factors that in turn control both Iran’s 
ability to acquire technology and supplier states’ ability to give help to its programs. The 
relationship among China, Russia, to a lesser degree North Korea, and Iran is central to 
the question of how threatening Iran can become in the future. The focal point of this 
collusion is the issue of its durability. It seems it will be a long-lasting relationship up 
until economic prosperity is realized in supplier countries. Attempts at halting the 
technology transfers to Iran such as those of the US do strain the Iranian missile 
developments. Iran knows that it will face various sanctions if it won’t be following its 
treaty obligations.179 
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Iran has perceived or faced threats from Iraq, the Soviet Union, the United States, 
and Israel at various times during the Cold War. Now with the exception of Russian 
Federation, the list endures. Turkey, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan may added to this list. 
Estimated Iranian threat perception is essential because it shapes the pattern of military 
build-up and priorities of the Iranian army. 
As a result of growing military cooperation with Turkey, Israel now effectively 
has a presence on the Turkish border with Iran, reportedly operates intelligence collection 
facilities there and Israeli reconnaissance or strike aircraft could overfly Turkey en route 
to Iran.180 Owing to that cooperation and its benefits to Israel, Iranian threat perception 
has increased regarding Turkey. Besides, Iran sees a revitalized Iraq as the greatest long-
term threat to its interests. Another threat coming from the west is the Jewish State. 
Above all, from the south, US presence through its naval power projection forces in the 
Gulf disturbs Iran considerably. Turkey is regarded as a new threat to the north emerging 
in the early 1990s, together with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, since the Gulf War 
the US has increased its forward military presence tremendously in the Gulf region. Iran 
sees this presence as a threat to its territorial integrity and political independence. This 
also limits its political and military freedom of action in the region. Iran believes that the 
United States tries to create an anti-Iranian bloc to its north and northeast, while it is 
encouraging the build up of regional oil and gas pipelines that bypass Iran. Therefore, it 
regards American encirclement efforts intended to harm its economy, reduce its freedom 
of action, and diplomatic room for maneuver. Iranian force deployments reflect these 
threat perceptions. Most of Iran’s ground forces are deployed near the border with Iraq. 
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Most of its air force is deployed toward Iraq and the Persian Gulf region as an indication 
of their threat perceptions.181 
Iranian MRBMs still have technical problems in addition to those of soft 
technology. Yet, Turkish decision-makers intend to pursue a deal for theater missile 
defense against loose nukes.182 It is a prudent move on the side of Turkey to consider the 
future probable role that Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles would play if they could 
overcome the technological obstacles one day. It is not clear whether Iran can locally 
produce the rocket motor for the Shahab-3 without particularly Chinese assistance. Still, 
it is a prudent move for Turkish military experts to plan for scenarios in which Shahabs 
are ready to be used by Iran. If technical problems defied and mass production is 
materialized, the Shahab-3 will enable Iran to target Israel, Turkey, and Egypt, and in the 
event of an Iranian-American encounter, the knowledge that they are within the range of 
Iranian missiles can influence leaders in Israel or Ankara. Accordingly, Turkish planners 
have become increasingly interested in obtaining anti-missile defenses.183 
The Shahab is of negligible value as a conventional weapon, as it is incapable of 
striking military targets with any precision. The ineffectiveness of ballistic missiles with 
conventional warheads was demonstrated in the second Gulf War by the Iraqi 
conventional ones that proved worthless in the strict military sense. The only conceivable 
value of the Shahab-3 is strategic, the delivery of nuclear, chemical or biological agents 
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of mass destruction. Iran has well-known chemical and developing biological 
capabilities, and is believed to be five to ten years away from developing nuclear 
weapons, largely depending on whether it acquires the necessary components and fissile 
material abroad or develops them on its own.184 Arming the Shahab-3 with 
unconventional warheads is a difficult undertaking. Developing both a reliable nuclear 
and biological warhead is difficult because of the need to insulate the components from 
degradation when the missile re-enters the atmosphere. Fitting the Shahab-3 with 
chemical warheads is much easier, but would require numerous tests.185  
The use of WMD to obtain leverage in the region may be more significant than 
the likelihood that these weapons would actually be used. Even their deployment-the 
threat of their use-is very destabilizing, inspiring serious caution by many Middle Eastern 
states.  
 
2.3 Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
Syria has made considerable progress in acquiring weapons of mass destruction 
since the mid-1970s. Syria has never shown a series interest in nuclear weapons, though 
it sought to obtain two small research reactors from China in 1992 and purchased a small 
30-kilowatt research reactor from China in 1991. Still, there is no evidence with regard to 
a nuclear weapons programme. It ratified the NPT on 9/24/69 and has not signed the 
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CTBT. Syria’s 30 kilowatt neutron-source research reactor is unsuitable for weapons 
production, and it allows inspections by IAEA as seen in February 1992.186 
 
2.3 Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.3.1 Syrian Missile Program 
Syria has four surface-to-surface missile brigades, 1 with Frog 7s, 1 with Scud Bs, 
1 with Scud Cs, and 1 with SS-21s. It obtained the FROG 7s in 1972 and the Scud B 
missiles in 1974. However, these missile forces did not play a major role for the Syrian 
army until Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982.187 Upon recognizing that Israel 
suppressed Syrian air force and much of its land-based air defenses in Lebanon, Syria 
perceived missiles as a means of countering Israeli advantage in the air, and as a deterrent 
to Israeli conventional air attacks. It is estimated that it has 18 SS-21 launchers and at 
least 36 SS-21 missiles with 80-100 kilometers range for which it may develop chemical 
warheads.188 Syria is reported to have up to 12 Scud B launchers and 200 Scud B missiles 
with 300-310 kilometers range. It is believed to have chemical warheads to be delivered 
by the Scud missiles.189  
Syria succeeded in obtaining North Korean deliveries of Scud C missiles. These 
deliveries are known to be starting on March 13, 1991 via a freighter called the Al-
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Yarmouk. The North Korean freighter Dae Hung Ho is claimed to be involved in these 
shipments. 
Approximately 50-80 Scud C missiles and 15-20 launchers have been delivered 
and manufactured since 1991, and it is maintained that several Syrian tests of the missile 
took place.190 These missiles give Syria the ability to hit targets within a range of 500-600 
kilometers with a payload of 450-600 kilograms. According to Anthony Cordesman, 
Syria has built two missile plants near Hama, about 110 miles north of Damascus. 191One 
is for solid fueled systems, and the other is for liquid fueled systems. It is controversial 
whether Syria can produce Scud Cs, but it is believed that North Korea may provide the 
necessary equipment for the liquid fuel plant. 
Syria sought also for M-9 missiles from China. Although Syria denies that, it is 
believed to meet many Syrian needs due to its range.192 It has a range in excess of 600 
kilometers. There are also reports that China sold Syria the M-1B missiles with ranges of  
50 to 60 miles, in 1990. Several sources points out that Syria is developing indigenous 
production capability for M-9 missiles. It has also a stockpile of cruise missiles and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).193 SS-N-36 Sepal with 450 km. range and 1,000 kg. 
payload, together with SS-N-20 Styx with 80 km. range and 513 kg. payload comprise 
Syria’s cruise missile force. Syria possesses Tupolev and Malachite UAVs with ranges of 
360 km. and 120 kms respectively. Besides, Syria has other means of delivery for WMD. 
It has shorter-range systems and strike fighters. Its inventory involves short range M-1B 
missiles with a range of 60 miles, 20 SU-20 ground attack aircraft 20 Su-24 long range 
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strike fighters, 30-60 operational MiG-23BM Flogger F fighter ground attack aircraft and 
multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery. Furthermore, Syria reportedly has improved 
its targeting capability in recent years by making use of commercial satellite imagery, 
much of which offers 3 meter levels of resolution.194 
 
2.3 Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.3.2 Syrian Chemical Weapons Capability 
Syrian troops probably began their WMD training after 1982, and Syria began to 
give chemical warfare a priority. This priority seems to be consequent upon the Syrian 
perception that it needs WMD as a way of maintaining its status relative to its regional 
military rivals as is the case with missiles. Experts indicate that Syria begun 
manufacturing and deploying non-persistent nerve and other gases in 1982 or 1983. By 
the late 1980s, Syria seems to have been operating two to three facilities for production of 
CW. 195One seems to be the Center d’Etdues et de Recherche Scientifique (CERS) that 
also possibly plays a role in the production of bioagents, another is near Homs, a third is 
near Saffirah, a village near Allepo. 
Syria first acquired small amounts of chemical weapons from Egypt in 1973. As 
noted, it began producing in 1982, and it is estimated to have started deploying chemical 
warheads for missiles in 1985.196 Military analysts believe it stockpiled 500 to 1,000 
metric tons of chemical agents. These include non-persistent nerve gases like Sarin and 
persistent nerve gas agents like VX. It is believed to have begun deploying VX, -a highly 
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lethal chemical agent-in 1997.197 It is argued that VX is being produced at a plant near 
Damascus. Syrians were caught smuggling feedstocks from Russia in 1993 and 1994. It 
obtained 1,800 pounds of feedstocks for nerve gas in 1993, and smuggled out another 
11,000 pounds in 1994.198  
As for the delivery systems and weapons, Syria is reported to have modified a 
variant of the Soviet ZAB series incendiary bomb to deliver chemical agents. It is 
estimated that it may have modified the PTAB-500 cluster bomb to carry chemical 
bomblets. Most probably, Syria have developed chemical artillery shells, and may be 
working on chemical munitions (chemical rounds) for its multiple rocket launchers.199 
Syrian Frog missiles may have been given priority and Frog warheads may be under 
development. Above all, focal point of Syrian chemical program seems to have been 
strategic. It is asserted that Syria modified its Scud missiles to deliver chemical weapons 
no later than 1987.200  A number of analysts argue that Syrian surface-to-surface missiles 
armed with chemical weapons were stored in the mountains near Damascus and in the 
Palmyra region.201 Putting chemical warheads on the Scud missiles gives Syria an 
effective system. Assuming a burst altitude of 1,100 meters, and a ground wind speed of 
three feet per second, optimal delivery conditions, the warhead could produce a 
contaminated area that would cover a band about 0,53 km. wide and 3.5 km. long. That 
assumes 50% of the exposed personnel would be casualties. This is a very impressive 
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lethality. If VX nerve agent is used, then the lethality remains for several days.202 Syrian 
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherche Scientifique (CERS) seems to manufacture bomblets 
that can be loaded into either Scud B or Scud C warheads and bombs, and which could be 
modified to disperse biological weapons. 
 
2.3 Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.3.3 Syrian Biological Weapons Capability 
Syrian Defense Minister, General Mustafa Tlas has written an article on 
biological warfare that was published in Iran. He gives many details with regard to 
biological warfare’s history, the concept of biowarfare, methods of exploitation, range 
and effectiveness of bioagents, prevention against biological agents and usage and 
application of a biological weapon in war. 203This is particularly significant because the 
author is the defense minister of Syria. 
Syria signed, but did not ratify the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC). There are reports of one underground facility and one near the 
coast. Analysts point to the dual-use sites including a pharmaceuticals plant in Aleppo 
which was left unfinished in 1989. These plants are widely distributed throughout the 
country and Syria may tap the potential of more than a dozen government-run 
pharmaceuticals plants, which could be converted rapidly to produce a wide variety of 
chemical and biological agents. Syria’s suppliers of CBW production technology and 
equipment were chemical brokerage houses in Holland, Switzerland, France, Austria and 
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Germany, including many of the companies that were supplying Iraq.204 According to 
Israeli sources, Syria was able to produce botulin and ricin toxins in 1991 using the 
mentioned channels and plants. It is estimated to have production capability for anthrax 
and botulism. Military experts state that although it is difficult to design adequate missile 
warheads to disseminate advanced agents such as anthrax, this is not beyond Syrian 
capabilities.205 It is argued that much of the technology needed to make effective cluster 
munitions and bomblets for VX gas can be adapted to the delivery of biological weapons. 
206Older types of biological weapons using wet agents, and placed in older bomb and 
warhead designs with limited dissemination capability is argued to achieve only a small 
fraction of the potential effectiveness of dry agents in weapons with excellent 
dissemination capability. Dry micropowders using advanced agents can have the 
effectiveness of small theater nuclear weapons. Biological weapons can be tailored to 
produce prompt or delayed kills, and different agents can be mixed to produce highly 
complicated effects that are very difficult to detect, characterize and treat.207 
 
2.4 Egypt’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability  
Egypt is one of the countries of proliferation concern in the Middle East. Because 
of its size, resources, conventional capabilities and the population, Egypt deserves no less 
attention than other Middle Eastern states. Egypt began three design programs based on 
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the V-2 missile in the 1950s with help from German scientists. By 1965, it tested two 
missiles, namely al-Zafir and al-Kahir, with ranges of 350 km and 600 km. 
respectively.208 These developmental efforts ceased around 1967. It cooperated with Iraq 
in paying for the development and production of ‘Badar 2000’ missile with a 750-1,000 
km. range. This missile is reported to be a version of the Argentine Condor II or Vector 
missile. Egypt began collaborating with Argentina in 1984 on the Badar 2000 missile, but 
this came to an end when US officials uncovered the endeavor.209 
Egypt has Scud B launchers and approximately 100 missiles with 300 km. range. 
There are reports indicating that it has worked on an improved version of the Scud B and 
Scud C with North Korean cooperation. This new variant’s range is believed to be 500 
km. Another liquid-fueled missile under development is stated as ‘Project T’, with an 
range of 450 km.210 In June 1999, CIA reported that Egypt had acquired Scud B parts 
from Russia and North Korea during 1996.211 Still, same CIA report underscores 
continuing Egyptian efforts to develop and produce the Scud B and Scud C and develop 
the two-stage ‘Vector’ short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Cairo is also reported to 
be interested in developing a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) as Iran has.212 
Three Egyptian companies are sanctioned by the US for transferring US-based 
technology to North Korea, which is on the MTCR forbidden transfer list. 
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Egypt has other potential delivery systems in addition to ballistic missiles. F-4E 
fighter ground attack aircraft, Mirage 5E2 fighter ground attack aircraft Mirage 2000EM 
fighters and F16A and 80 F16C fighters, along with multiple rocket launchers and tube 
artillery constitute a huge inventory of delivery means. Furthermore, it has AS-15, SS-N-
2 and CSS-N-1 cruise missiles. 
 
2.4 Egypt’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.4.1 Egypt’s Chemical Weapons Capability 
Egyptian chemical weapons procurement program has begun under Gamel Abdel 
Nasser's control. Egypt, which is not a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC), is known to have produced and used mustard gas in Yemeni civil war in 1963-
1967.213 However, it is reported that agents-used may have been stocks British abandoned 
in Egypt after World War II.214 It is argued that Egypt completed research and designs for 
production of nerve and cyanide gas before 1973.215 It supplied Syria with chemical 
weapons in early 1970s, and Iraq with CW agents and technology during the 1980s. 
Former Egyptian Minister of War, General Abdel Ranny Gamassay's statement made in 
1975, reinforces the estimates that Egypt has several production facilities chemical agents 
such as mustard and nerve gas are plausible.  He stated that, "if Israel should decide to 
use a nuclear weapon in the battlefield, we shall use the weapons of mass destruction that 
are at our disposal."  Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) points out that Egypt 
may have limited stocks of bombs, rockets, and shells, and that there are unconfirmed 
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reports of recent efforts to acquire feed stocks for nerve gas.216  It is stated also that it has 
a stockpile of chemical agents (mustard and nerve agents). Furthermore, there are 
estimates in that Egyptian industrial infrastructure present for rapid production of cyanide 
gas.217  
 
2.4 Egypt’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.4.2 Egypt’s Biological Weapons Capability 
There is no evidence of major organized biological research activity. It may have 
a biological weapons program, though not large in scale.218 Egypt signed the BTWC on 
4/10/72, but has not ratified it. It is reported that Egypt's biological warfare efforts may 
include work on plague, botulism toxin and the encephalitis virus. Other research is said 
to include anthrax, rift valley fever, and mycotoxicosis.219 The extent of weaponization of 
any of these agents is unknown, but it is maintained that extensive domestic Egyptian 
armaments industry is probably capable of devising a variety of suitable delivery 
systems.220 In 1970, the president of Egypt Anwar al-Sadat was reported to have stated 
that “Egypt has biological weapons stored in refrigerators and could use them against 
Israel’s crowded population.” Al-Sadat’s declaration was interpreted as an intention to 
warn Israel against a nuclear strike, and Israel did in fact contemplate the use of nuclear 
weapons in the Yom Kippur War in 1973.  
                                                                                                                                                 
215 Cordesman, op cit.p.22. 
216 Federation of American Scientists WMD Profiles-Egypt, www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/egypt.htm 
217 Ibid 
218 The report on WMD, October 4, 1999 www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/WMD.html 
219 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile capabilities in the Middle East, Egypt 
http://www.cns.miis.edu/ research/wmdme/egypt.htm 
220 Egyptian Biological Weapons Program, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/bw; Dany Shaham, “The 
Evolution of Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt”, Ariel Center for Policy Research, 
http://www.acps.org.il/publications/arab-attitude/pp46-xs.html. 
 83
 
2.4 Egypt’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
2.4.3 Egypt’s Nuclear Weapons Development Program 
The Egyptian nuclear program was launched in 1954. Egypt acquired its first 
nuclear reactor from the Soviet Union in 1961.221 President Gamal Abdel-Nasser at 
Inchass -in the Nile Delta- opened the two-megawatt reactor. After the 1967 defeat at the 
war with Israel the Egyptians gave up their nuclear procurement effort. Seemingly, Egypt 
has decided to concentrate on increasing conventional forces, and chemical and 
biological weapons, rather than developing nuclear weapons ever after.   However, at the 
same time, serious work on developing nuclear potential designated for use in power 
engineering, agriculture, medicine, biotechnology, and genetics continued.222 It is 
declared that industrial incorporation of four explored uranium deposits was planned, 
including the extraction and enrichment of uranium for subsequent use as fuel for atomic 
power plants. Egypt tried to cooperate with the US in the mid-1970s, and the US 
promised to provide Egypt with eight nuclear power plants and the necessary cooperation 
agreements were signed.223 In the late 1970s, the US unilaterally revised the bilateral 
agreements and introduced new conditions that were unacceptable to the Egyptian 
government. It appears that the decision to ratify the NPT was taken with one goal in 
mind: the implementation of a nuclear power program. Egypt acceded to the NPT in 
1981, and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. Before his 
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assassination in 1981, President Anwar Sadat announced plans to build two nuclear 
power stations along the Mediterranean coast. These plans, though, were subsequently 
shelved.224 FAS sources indicated there were reports that Egypt is planning a Chinese-
made power reactor, variously assessed at between 300 MW and 600 MW, that could 
have the capacity to produce material for the production of as many as four nuclear 
warheads a month.225  
Egypt is believed to be seeking joint nuclear weapons research with Syria and 
Saudi Arabia to share costs and allow Egypt to continue its conventional military buildup. 
Besides, in early 1992, a deal was made for Argentina to deliver one more reactor with a 
capacity of 22 megawatts to Egypt6. The contract signed in 1991 for the delivery to 
Egypt of a Russian MGD-20 cyclotron accelerator remains in force.226 Since 1990, a 
number of Egyptian scientific projects are being carried out under the aegis of the IAEA. 
There are bilateral agreements in the area of the peaceful use of atomic energy with 
Germany, the United States, Russia, India, China, and Argentina. There are, moreover, 
agreements with Great Britain and India to provide assistance in training national cadres 
for scientific research and work on the country's atomic enterprises. Moreover, since 
1974, Egypt has taken the initiative of proposing to render the Middle East nuclear-
weapons free zone, calling all countries in the region without exception to join the NPT. 
In April 1990, Egypt took the initiative to render the Middle East free of weapons of 
mass destruction. The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference established a multinational 
mechanism to work on making the Middle East a nuclear weapon-free zone. This 
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mechanism, however, stalled three years ago as a result of the Israeli position. Egypt also 
hosted in April 1996 the conference for signing the declaration on rendering Africa a 
nuclear-weapons free zone. President Mubarak did say in October 1998, that Egypt could 
acquire nuclear weapons to match Israel’s capability if this proves necessary,  “If the time 
comes when we need nuclear weapons, we will not hesitate. I say ‘if’ we have to because 
this is the last thing we think about. We do not think of joining the nuclear club.227” This 
speech was evaluated as more of an effort to push Israel towards disarmament talks than 
any kind of threat.  
 
2.5 Saudi Arabia’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
The proliferation of ballistic missiles, along with CBRN capabilities, is a major 
potential threat to international relations, and to the Middle East in particular. Although 
Saudi Arabia supports arms control treaties that limit biological, chemical, and nuclear 
weapons, it is unclear whether those alone suffice to defend against military threats 
exposed by Iran and Iraq. Saudi Arabia is vulnerable to foreign invasion as evidenced by 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Iraqi forces threatened Saudi hinterland, and 
occupied the Saudi town of Khafji after a quick fight in January 1991.Only US-led 
ground campaign saved Saudi Arabia from a potential invasion.228 Saudis count on US 
for positive security assurance. It is unlikely for Saudi Arabia that it will jeopardize its 
security relationship with US by means of a WMD procurement effort. However, 
alliances are always precarious in international relations given that security interests -
rather than friendship- are the main impetus of policy. Therefore, if need be, it can risk its 
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relation with US in the name of another more vital national interest, namely national 
survival. Because Iran and Iraq are both seeking to improve their long-range missile, 
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons capabilities, they pose a significant threat 
against Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, this threat becomes manifolded given that Saudi 
Arabia does not have any CBRN programs, and it falls short of conventional parity with 
Baghdad and Tehran.229 Thus, it would be imprudent for Riyadh to assume that US would 
always come to its defense. Different sources indicate that it has no nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons programs.230 However, Saudi Arabia has a foundation for building a 
nuclear deterrent. It possesses CSS-2 (DF-3), long-range (2,400 to 3,100 kilometers) 
surface-to-surface missiles, acquired from China as a reaction to 'the war of the cities' 
during the Iran- Iraq War. CSS-2 ballistic missiles would serve as an ideal delivery 
system for Saudi nuclear weapons.231 
The Saudis bought 50 to 60 missiles, 10-15 mobile launchers, and technical 
support from China at a cost of about $3 billion to 3.5 billion. American intelligence 
failed to detect the international transfer of intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well as 
the Saudi personnel who began traveling to China for training purposes.232 Because CSS-
2 missiles are largely political symbols and have only token warfighting capability, they 
are reported to have begun to seek a replacement for the present missiles.233 This raises a 
serious concern due to several reasons. First, CSS-2 is a very costly weapon. It is being 
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produced in very small numbers with Chinese assistance. Second, it has a low lethality 
rate owing to its conventional payload and a high circular error probable (2 to 4 
kilometers). In China same system is used for the delivery of nuclear weapons, but China 
configured it to have only conventional payload. Saudi Arabia and China assured US that 
its payload would remain conventional.234 Third, it is argued that as now configured, the 
missile system may do more to provoke attack or escalation than to deter attack or 
provide retaliatory capability.235 This point became clear to the Saudis during the Gulf 
War. King Fahd rejected advice to retaliate against Iraqi strikes because he felt that 
strikes that killed civilians would have a provocative, rather than a deterrent effect.236 
Finally and most importantly, Saudi acquisition of chemical or nuclear warheads would 
radically improve the value of the system as a deterrent or retaliatory weapon. Hence, 
they may work clandestinely to develop a nuclear capability as much the way they 
acquired CSS- 4, and as much the way Iraqis tried to develop an atomic bomb prior to the 
Gulf War. Richard Russell argues that insecurity and the regional proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction may very well be pushing Riyadh towards procuring a 
nuclear deterrent.237 This possibility makes Saudi Arabia a state of proliferation concern.  
Under the circumstances, Saudi officials conducted suspicious contacts. Saudi 
Arabian Prince and other Saudi military officials have toured Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
facilities in 1999 after Pakistan’s nuclear tests, but there is no evidence that they intend to 
buy an “Islamic bomb.” The only disturbing aspect of talks with Pakistan is stated to be 
some estimates indicating Pakistan’s production of fissile material will begin to exceed 
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its domestic military requirements at some point around 2005. Besides, little data are 
available of what discussion Saudi Arabia had with China about the possible purchase of 
weapons of mass destruction. According to a Saudi defector, the Saudi inclination to buy 
security may have included attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. Mohammed Khilewi, 
first secretary at the Saudi mission to the United Nations until July 1994, said that the 
Saudis have sought a bomb since 1975. According to Khilewi, the Saudis sought to buy 
nuclear reactors from China, supported Pakistan's nuclear program, and contributed $5 
billion to Iraq's nuclear weapons program between 1985 and 1990.238 These actions 
would violate Saudi commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which 
Saudi Arabia signed in 1988 to ease concern over their purchase of long-range Chinese 
ballistic missiles. 
The CSS-2 acts as a low-level deterrent and a symbol of Saudi Arabia's 
willingness to retaliate against Iraqi and Iranian strikes. The CSS-2 also symbolizes the 
risk that Saudi Arabia will buy much more capable missile and seek weapons of mass 
destruction. Saudi Arabia has Patriot 2 missiles as a missile defense system. The Patriot 2 
missiles in Saudi inventory have only limited intercept capability against advanced Scud 
missiles. While a new defensive missile system is planned to be provided-the Patriot 3-, it 
is not clear when and if it can be effective against more advanced missiles with higher 
closure speeds. Iran is already testing such missiles, and it is perfectly plausible that Iraq 
will develop them if it can break out of sanctions. While nations like Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Libya, and Syria are the major proliferators in the region, Saudi possession of the CSS-2 
can also be interpreted as an incentive to be a part of the missile arms race in the Middle 
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East, or acquire weapons of mass destruction. Despite Saudi acquisition of CSS-2 does 
not provide them with any real deterrent, it does make them a possible target during a 
conflict. It can well be thought that CSS-2 is only meaningful when they have nuclear, 
biological, or chemical warheads. Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia may well opt 
for WMD. 
 
2.6 Israel's Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
 
2.6.1 Israel’s Missile Capabilities 
  Israel's is the only army in Middle East that has the most advanced conventional 
and unconventional military capabilities. Experts indicate that as a part of its first long-
range missile force, Israel deployed up to 50 Jericho I (YA-1) missiles with 500km range 
and 500kg payload.239 These missiles are argued to be near copies of two-stage, solid-
fueled, French MD-620 missile. What is more, it possesses approximately 50 Jericho-II 
missiles with 1,500km range, and 1,000kg payload, and reportedly nuclear warheads 
might be stored in close proximity to the missiles. Apparently, Jericho II had its first tests 
in 1986 over the Mediterranean that reached a range of 460 kilometres (288 miles). 
Another test across the Mediterranean reached a range of 820 kilometres (510 miles) 
landing south of Crete.240 Israel also launched another Jericho missile across 
Mediterranean that landed about 250 miles north of Benghazi, Libya.  Since its maximum 
range is 1,500 kilometres, it seemingly can cover the entire Arab World, and even the 
south of Russian Federation. Furthermore, it is stated that Israel began work on an 
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updated version of the Jericho II in 1995 in an effort to stretch its range to 2,000km.241 It 
is controversial how Israel deploys its missiles. They may be deployed on mobile 
launchers or in underground bunkers or through transport-erector-launchers (TELs). 
Jane's Intelligence Review published its satellite photos of what it said as a Jericho 
missile base. The journal's assertion was that a TEL was used in the base.242 There are 
reports of the development of a long-range, nuclear-armed version of Popeye air-to-
surface missile with global positioning system (GPS) guidance, and reports of possible 
cruise missile designs that can be both surface-ship and submarine based.243 Still, another 
variant of the Popeye air-to-surface missile is believed to have a nuclear warhead. Israel 
bought 160 MGM-52 Lance missiles (with 130km range and 450kg payload) from the 
US in the 1970s. In addition, the Jewish State has 'Shavit' space launch vehicle (SLV) 
with 4,500km range and 150kg to 250kg. payload. There are unconfirmed reports of 
Jericho-3 program under development using Shavit technologies, with a range up to 
4,800km and 1000kg payload. It is maintained that Israel currently reviews its military 
doctrine including its missile basing options, the hardening and dispersal systems. There 
are also sources indicating that Israel will solve its survivability problems by deploying 
nuclear-armed missiles on its new submarines. Foreign Report stated that Israel could 
develop a sea-based assured second-strike capability using three dolphin-class diesel 
electric submarines that Germany recently provided to Israel. The Federation of 
American Scientists (FAS) reports that Israel may have secretly carried out its first test 
launches of cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads from the German-built 
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submarines in May 2000.244 Some reports also indicate that Israeli submarines may be 
capable of carrying nuclear-armed Popeye Turbo cruise missiles to provide a second-
strike capability.  Popeye Turbo is an air-launched cruise missile that is estimated to be 
operational by 2002.245  Foreign Report stated that Israel could develop a sea-based 
assured second-strike capability using three dolphin-class diesel electric submarines that 
Germany recently provided to Israel.246 Indeed, an Israeli analyst asserted that Israel has 
already gained the second strike capability.247 The Federation of American Scientists 
(FAS) reports that Israel may have secretly carried out its first test launches of cruise 
missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads from the German-built dolphin class 
submarines in the Indian Ocean.248  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6 Israel's Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
 
2.6.2 Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Capability 
Israel, although widely recognised as possessing a sophisticated nuclear arsenal, 
has never openly tested nuclear weapons. There is no solid evidence that Israel has ever 
conducted a nuclear test, although some have suggested that a large seismic event that 
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occurred in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979 was the result of a joint South African-
Israeli nuclear test.249 Until July 1998, not even any single Israeli official made 
declaration that the country has nuclear weapons. At a press conference in Jordan in 13 
July 1998, former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres publicly admitted, "Israel built a 
nuclear option not in order to have a Hiroshima but an Oslo."250  After the nuclear 
weapons tests in South Asia251 in May 1998, Israeli government is prompted in a 
reevaluation of the country's ambiguous or 'opaque' nuclear weapon status. Israel 
maintained a long-standing policy of ambiguity regarding its nuclear arsenal, frequently 
expressed in the statement that "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons 
into the Middle East". Nevertheless, Israel refuses to allow international inspection 
(International Atomic Energy Agency -IAEA- inspection) of their main nuclear reactor, 
Dimona.252 Israel has signed the CTBT, but is not a party to the NPT. As for its nuclear 
capacity, there are different figures. However, recent consensus is that it has the capacity 
to have produced 100-200 nuclear warheads.253 The Federation of American Scientists 
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(FAS) have confirmed such capacity, and published new photographs of Israel's Dimona 
nuclear reactor in August 2000. Dimona is the most important Israeli nuclear reactor. The 
other is the 5-megawatt highly enriched uranium (HEU) light-water reactor at Nahal 
Soreq. Dimona is a 40-150 megawatt heavy water reactor, which is not under 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It was argued to be a natural 
uranium reactor used for the production of the fissile material. Yet, the satellite imagery 
published by FAS is interpreted as that Israel has probably not undertaken large-scale 
production of enriched uranium at Dimona.254 Although previous reports have alleged 
that the Israelis began projects to enrich uranium using gas centrifuge and laser 
separation techniques in the 1980's, photos of the Space Imaging Corporation's IKONOS 
satellite provided important clues as to the amount of plutonium and enriched uranium 
the reactor can produce.255 These, in turn, can be used to estimate the possible size of 
Israel's nuclear arsenal. There were reports that Israel has built additional facilities 
(cooling towers) near Dimona.256  It is stated that a comparison of the IKONOS photos 
with declassified American satellite photos from the 1960s indicates that there have been 
no additional cooling towers built at Dimona since 1971. The FAS report concluded that 
"based on plausible upper and lower bounds of the operating practices at the reactor, 
Israel could have produced enough plutonium for at least 100 nuclear weapons, but 
probably not significantly more than 200 weapons". Previous estimates ranged as high as 
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400.257 This sophisticated nuclear weapons program, with an estimated 100-200 weapons, 
can be delivered by ballistic missiles or aircraft. Along with the ballistic missiles, Israel 
has a wide range of delivery means of WMD including cruise missiles and aircraft. 
Cruise missile force comprises of Delilah/STAR-1 UAV with 400km range and 50kg 
payload, Gabriel-4 anti-ship cruise missile with 200km range and 500kg payload, and 
Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile with 120km range and 220kg payload. Its aircraft 
inventory include fighter and ground-attack aircraft: 2 F-15I, 6 F-15D, 18 F-15C, 2 F-
15B, 36 F-15A, 54 F-16D, 76 F-16C, 8 F-16B, 67 F-16A, 50 F-4E-2000, 25 F-4E, 20 
Kfir C7, and 50 A-4N. Ground systems include artillery and rocket launchers.258  
 
2.6 Israel's Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
 
2.6.3 Israel’s Chemical Weapons Capability 
Israel signed the CWC on 1/13/93, and is currently debating its ratification. It has 
an active chemical weapons program, but is not believed to have deployed chemical 
warheads on ballistic missiles. Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), FAS and other 
specialists claim that the Jewish State possesses production capability for mustard and 
nerve agents.259 It is reportedly capable of gas warfare and defending against chemical 
weapons. According to some reports, Israel revitalized its chemical warfare facilities 
south of Dimona in the mid-1980s, after Syria deployed chemical weapons and Iraq 
                                                                                                                                                 
256 "Israel’s nuclear reactor on the World Wide Web", IsraelWire, Thursday, August 17, 2000; "Photos 
Reveal Israeli Nuclear Capacity", Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol.2, No.8, 5 September 2000, p.2. 
257 Elizabeth Stevens, "Israel's Nuclear Weapons - A Case Study", Nonproliferation Analysis ,Volume I,  
Issue 1, Summer 1995, pp.2-5. 
258 Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies Online Edition, January 2001, pp.27-31 
259 Center for Nonproliferation Studies-Monterey Institute of International Studies Middle East Program, 
http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/israel.htm 
 95
began to use these weapons in the Iran-Iraq War.260 Anthony Cordesman points to a 
cooperation between America and Israel in the chemical field. He states that a cargo 
plane in October 4 1992 crashed in southern Amsterdam killing 43 in the apartment 
complex it hit. The extensive examination after the crash revealed that the plane was 
carrying 50 gallons of dimethyl methlphosphonate, a chemical used to make sarin nerve 
gas. He further states that Israelis first denied this and then claimed it was only being 
imported to test gas masks.261 Israel has extensive field exercises in chemical defense. 
Israeli army has stockpiled gas masks, and was the only one distributing them to its 
population during the Gulf War. Israel has also warhead delivery capability for bombs, 
rockets and missiles though it is not believed that it deployed chemical warheads.262 
 
2.6 Israel's Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability 
 
2.6.4 Israel’s Biological Weapons Capability 
 Israel has not signed the BWC. It has conducted extensive research into 
weaponization of biological agents and defense against biowarfare. It is believed to be 
ready to quickly produce biological weapons, but that there is not any active production 
effort.263 Israel is extensively reported to have a biological research facility, Israeli 
Institute for Biological Research at Ness Ziona, about 12 miles south of Tel Aviv. It is 
underlined that this facility created enough public concern in Israel so that the mayor of 
Ness Ziona wanted it to be moved away from populated areas. The facility is reported to 
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have stockpiled anthrax.264  An Israeli analyst privately confirmed that Israel has fully 
developed bombs and warheads capable of effectively disseminating dry storable 
biological agents in micropowder form. 265 
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CHAPTER III 
SELECTED RHETORICAL STATEMENTS  
 3.1 Iraqi Statements 
Ten years after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Saddam Hussein's regime remains in 
power. It is still refusing to allow inspection teams to verify that Iraq is deprived of its 
WMD. Despite years of sanctions, ongoing military actions, routine bombardments to 
enforce no-fly zones, he refuses to surrender his remaining weapons of mass destruction. 
The unity that the international community formed to liberate Kuwait seems to have 
vanished with the only exception of UK and US remaining determined to contain Iraq. 
Owing to the oil for food program, Saddam has attempted to upgrade its air defenses 
since the 1990-1991 Gulf War. It is reported that Baghdad is trying to modify its ground 
forces equipment to augment its dwindling air-defense equipment.266 In the mean time 
Saddam Hussein tries to reposition himself as the leader of the Arab World against the 
West and Israel. In March 2001, he addressed the Arab summit calling for war to liberate 
Palestine. He also called for Arab unity, while making a direct link between Islam and 
Arabism. Saddam appealed to the entire Arab nation to fight Israel and America. He is 
also reported to make a hostile reference to 'two foreign countries' (both ethnically non-
Arab countries), which border the Arab nations, namely Turkey and Iran.267 Moreover 
Saddam declared that he could raise an army to fight those Western and foreign forces. 
There are reports that ordinary Arabs believe that Saddam is prepared to do it. Jane's 
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Security reports that there is increasing evidence his grass-roots support throughout the 
Arab world is growing.268 He is continuously portraying himself as a staunch defender of 
the Arab rights and his calls for war may well be widely popular among the Arab 
community. Besides, head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yaser Arafat called 
for Saddam's help in the fight against Israel again in March 2001.269 On March 3 2001, 
former Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz sent a letter to the Arab Union. It is indicated 
that because Turkey gives logistical support to air raids conducted towards Iraq, it holds 
full responsibility in these actions that harm the Iraqi people. He, further stated that Iraq 
has the right to self-defense, and asked Turkey to compensate for all the damage done by 
the air raids.270  
 
 3.2 Iranian Statements  
As for Iran, there are more worrying declarations than Iraq's. Iran's Defense Minister 
publicly acknowledged the development of the Shahab-4. He first called it a more 
capable ballistic missile than the Shahab-3, but later categorized it as a space launch 
vehicle with no military applications.271 Iran's Defense Minister Ali Shamkani also 
publicly announced plans to develop a Shahab-5 which is estimated to be a 
intercontinental ballistic missile or a space launch vehicle. On July 21 1998 Iran tested 
Shahab-3 claiming that it was a defensive action to deal with potential threats from its 
neighbors. General Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, head of the Islamic revolutionary Guards 
Corps' air wing publicly reported on August 2 1998 that Shahab-3 was guided by an 
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Iranian-made system that gives its accuracy.272 He said, "The final test of every weapon 
is in a real war situation but, given its warhead and size the Shahab-3 is a very accurate 
weapon." President Mohammed Khatami on August 1 1998 stated that Iran was 
determined to continue to strengthen its armed forces, regardless of international 
concerns:273 "Iran will not seek permission from anyone for strengthening its defense 
capability". Iran publicly displayed the Shahab-3 on its launcher during a parade on 
September 1998. The missile carrier bore signs saying "The US can do nothing" and 
"Israel would be wiped from the map". Israel's army chief, Lieutenant-General Shaul 
Mofaz told Israeli radio that the combined development of the missile and a non-
conventional capacity posed a threat not only to Israel, but also to any country within 
range of the missile.274 Iran tested a solid state missile it called the Shahab-D on 
September 20, 2000. The Iranian Deputy Defense Minister, Vice Admiral Ali Shamkani, 
claimed that it was part of a peaceful program for launching satellites. What is more 
alarming is that in October 1991, Iran's deputy President Ayatollah Mohajerani stated that 
Iran should work with other Islamic states to create an 'Islamic bomb'.275 However, when 
President Rafsanjani was asked if Iran had a nuclear program in an interview in the CBS 
program 60 Minutes in February 1997, replied "Definitely not. I hate this weapon."276 
Other senior Iranian leaders including President Khatami have made similar denials. 
Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi stated on October 5, 1997 that "We are certainly 
not developing an atomic bomb, because we do not believe in nuclear weapons. We 
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believe in and promote the idea of the Middle East as a region free of nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction. But why are we interested to develop nuclear 
technology? We need to diversify our energy resources. In a matter of a few decades, our 
oil and gas reserves would be finished and therefore, we need access too other sources of 
energy. Furthermore, nuclear technology has many other utilities in medicine and 
agriculture. The case of the United States in terms of oil reserve is not different from 
Iran's. The United States also has large oil resources, but at the same time they have 
nuclear power plants. So there is nothing wrong with having access to nuclear technology 
if it is for peaceful purposes."277 Besides, Iranian officials have repeatedly complained 
that the West tolerated Iraqi use of chemical weapons and its nuclear and biological 
build-up during the Iran-Iraq War, and has a dual standard where it does not demand 
inspections of Israel or that Israel sign the NPT. Again denying Iranian efforts to have 
nuclear weapons, the Iranian Ministry of Defense stated on January 18 2000 that " the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, which has taken the initiative to launch a dialogue of 
civilizations does not need to resort to nuclear weapons or violence."278 In 17 May 2000, 
Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has accused Iran of failing to respond to evidence 
of Iranian involvement in the murders of Turkish pro-secular writers and academics, 
referring to violence committed by Iran.279 On July 31 2001, Iran reportedly test-fired an 
anti-armour missile capable of destroying the most sophisticated armoured equipment: 
”The Saeqeh-1 enjoys a high infiltration capability and can destroy the most sophisticated 
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armoured equipment in the world", Iranian Defence Ministry announced.280 Iran which is 
under a western arms embargo since the Islamic revolution of 1979 has reacted by 
designing and manufacturing its own sophisticated weaponry including missiles, 
submarines and helicopters and claims to be reaching self-sufficiency in defense. It is 
reported that the Azarakhsh fighter aircraft and the Tondar training jet aircraft, built by 
the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, will fly soon. Second Brig-Gen Olfati, 
the head of the Self-sufficiency Jihad of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, said: "The 
Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran is implementing 100 armoured, missile and 
naval vessel projects. Taking into account the 400 projects already implemented, it has 
taken a significant step towards self-sufficiency and foreign currency saving".281  
Iranian Defence Minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani said on 21 August 2001that his 
ministry will push ahead with its plans to develop a "defensive" military force for the 
country to act as a "deterrent" to regional and international threats.  He declared: "A 
further push for development and restructuring of the defensive capabilities of the 
country to the point where we can effectively establish a deterrent force and achieve 
defence preparedness against regional and international threats to the country's national 
security is among the fundamental plans of the defence ministry," he said at an open 
session of parliament while defending his current portfolio. He said the ministry was also 
seeking "to acquire arms with effective deterrent capabilities," upgrade the hardware in 
its aeronautics industries as well as produce military equipment with high range, 
precision and "destruction."282 Iranian News Agency reports that Iran has succeeded in 
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producing its own version of a transport plane, a combat helicopter, a submarine and a 
guided-missile warship.  In addition to test-firing an armour-piercing anti-tank missile the 
Sa'eqeh-1 (lightning) missile capable of destroying the most sophisticated armoured 
equipment, in May this year Iran also successfully test-fired a domestically made solid-
fuelled missile. The surface-to-surface rocket can be guided to destroy targets with high 
accuracy. It is claimed that the Fateh (Victorious) 110 was totally planned and produced 
by Iranian experts at its army headquarters and that it greatly boosts the country's military 
superiority and self-sufficiency.283 The country successfully test-fired last year a version 
of its Shahab-3 missile with a range of 1,300 kilometres (800 miles). 
Political relations between the countries in the second half of the 1990s appear to 
seem warm. Although they are rivals with regard to the Caucasus and Central Asia, two 
sides do come to a table, and enter into an effective political dialogue nevertheless. Upon 
the invitation of the Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Harrazi, Turkish Foreign Minister 
İsmail Cem paid an official visit to Iran on February 12,2001. During his two days visit, 
Cem met President Muhammed Khatami, Parliamentary head Mehdi Kerrubi and Kamal 
Harrazi. The contacts’ focal point was the development of bilateral relations with regard 
to economy and regional security. Khatami stated that Cem’s visit proved most beneficial 
in their relation to Turkey on political, economic and commercial grounds. Cem pointed 
out that Harrazi’s last visit to Ankara reinforced the warm relations taking place for the 
last three years. He announced of a plan to establish Turkish-Iranian Commercial Council 
and that the organization of the Turkish side was about to be completed.284 In their joint 
press meeting, ministers of both countries explained some of the details of cooperation on 
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transportation and information technology. They declared that Istanbul-Tehran railroad 
would be operating soon. Ministers underscored the fact that they are very pleased 
because of the warm and constructive relations between countries, and that there is a 
cultural program signed by Turkey and Iran in order to improve relations further. What is 
more stated is that Iranian natural gas, when its transportation started, would ameliorate 
economic relations upgrading the commercial quotas up to nearly $2 billion dollars. The 
ministers also told they reached to a consensus that they would inform and activate their 
security establishment and units in line with their will to improve already enhancing 
security relationship.285 
 
3.3 Egyptian Statements 
Egyptian President Mubarak's aide said Egypt was prepared to deter any Israeli 
attack, Egyptian News Agency reported. Asked about the possibility of an attack to 
Egypt, he told that Egypt is well prepared to deter any attack.286 In August 2001, news of 
a planned deal to sell North Korean No-Dong surface-to-surface missiles to Egypt 
became public. About the deal, a senior Israeli security source said, "The Americans will 
worry about this deal; we are more concerned by other missile transactions, between the 
Americans and Egypt."287 Egypt has reportedly denied it has such plans to acquire the 
Korean missiles, while the US State Department has said it has received "satisfactory 
answers," from Cairo that make it believe that the missile program is "within acceptable 
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limits." According to the Haaretz report, the Israeli defense establishment recently 
expressed its concerns to the US about the approval given to sell Egypt Harpoon missiles, 
which can be launched from ships and jet fighters, standard missiles launched from ships, 
and especially a package of Patriot missiles. The Israeli Air Force views this as a 
significant upgrading of Egypt's anti-aircraft defense system.288 According to the report, 
the US claims that the arms it supplies to Egypt are intended for defense or deterrence.289 
Going back to the recent past declarations, former Egyptian Minister of War, General 
Abdel Ranny Gamassay stated in 1975 that "if Israel should decide to use a nuclear 
weapon in the battlefield, we shall use the weapons of mass destruction that are at our 
disposal."290 Some reports claim that Anwar al-Sadat said in 1970 that Egypt has 
biological weapons stored in refrigerators and could use them against Israel's crowded 
population. This report indicates that Egyptian biological capability includes work on 
plague, botulism toxin, encephalitis virus, anthrax, rift fever, and mycotoxicosis.291 
Furthermore, before his assassination in 1981 President Anwar Sadat announced plans to 
build two nuclear power stations along the Mediterranean cost.292 President Hosni 
Mubarak said, in October 1998, that Egypt could acquire nuclear weapons to match 
Israel's capability if it becomes necessary: " If the time comes when we need nuclear 
weapons, we will not hesitate. I say ' if ' we have to because this is the last thing we think 
about. We do not think of joining the nuclear club."293 President Hosni Mubarak, on 
September 29, 1998 said that peace should be supported with power: "Israel wants to 
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monopolise all types of nuclear weapons and missiles and wants to deny others the right 
to procure the same weapons," said Mubarak in an interview with the Egyptian daily Al 
Ahram.294 
 
3.4 Syrian Statements 
Syria is still a very tightly controlled dictatorship, and the decision making 
process was entirely in the hands of former President Assad and he seldom spoke, and not 
all on WMD. However, in August 29 1997, the Syrian Minister of Defense Mustafa Tlass 
warned Israel against launching a surprise attack. He said that Israel would pay dearly for 
any attack on Syria. He also added that Israeli policies had created a very bad situation in 
the area and the policies closed the door on any hope for peace in the Middle East.295 
Furthermore, Defense Minister Tlass wrote an article on how to conduct a biological 
warfare published in an Iranian newspaper. The article, which can be seen in the 
appendix, includes information on range, effectiveness and methods of exploitation of 
bioagents in detail.  
Turkey and Syria have been at loggerheads for years over the issues of water and 
terrorism. After the October 1998 crisis between the countries296, an agreement was 
signed in Adana (although it is generally referred to as an "agreement", the document 
actually is entitled "minutes", suggesting that it is something short of a full-fledged 
agreement), and relations started to get warm. Continuing mutual military visits took 
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place in 2001, and the two countries also held a meeting on the resumption of regular 
train services.297 Countries signed a protocol to improve relations in the fields of 
economic and commercial relations, scientific, technical, educational, and cultural 
relations in June 2001.298 Ankara is also cooperating with Damascus on a pipeline to 
carry 175 billion cubic feet of gas a year from Egypt through Jordan and Syria to 
Turkey.299 As of August 2 2001, the two sides were working on a friendship cooperation 
document.300 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the post-Cold War period, there is still no authority to be relied on to help the 
weak. Therefore, international system is still anarchic. A change occurred in the 
international system when the bipolar structure of the world disappeared, but the system 
itself did not change. Throughout history, states sought devices that they hoped would 
change the status quo. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction provided them with 
very effective war devices to achieve so.   
With the end of the Cold War balance of power, some states have increasingly 
sought to redefine their power status regarding their neighbors. This revisionist urge 
caused a rapid increase in mass destruction weapons proliferation. Incentives of the states 
of proliferation importance are a robust combination of political, military and economic 
origin. The value of WMD as a political tool originates in their use to achieve coercion. 
By changing the potential costs associated with defending vital national security interests 
of any state under WMD threat exposure, proliferators may alter calculation of interests; 
deter military intervention or the use of threat of force. This compels any adversary to 
redefine its regional role. Hence, WMD has the capacity to change the regional balance 
of power. 
 Each type of WMD has its own effects, but generally the military utility of 
chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons is twofold: First changing the 
conduct of war and risk assessments through the threat of use. This deterrence effect can 
prevent any state from threatening or beginning armed hostilities, reducing its power (the 
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ability to change or manipulate other states’ actions). Secondly, WMD raises the cost of 
any future conflict owing to the latent catastrophic damage that can be made against 
military units or civilian populations. It may well threaten the survival of a country by 
means of destroying the linchpin of the political body, namely the capital. What’s more, 
states view the development and possession of WMD as providing economic benefits. 
States may seek to produce and sell these capabilities for capital or barter for other 
weapons. Indigenous production is likely to enable states such as Iran to take advantage 
of the WMD trade. 
Turkey’s neighbors (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) conduct 
extensive unconventional weapons procurement programs. Even if Turkey does not know 
whether they have the intention to actually use them, these procurement efforts and 
emerging WMD arsenals pose a credible threat towards Turkey. Because above 
mentioned military, political and economic benefits can be gained through mere 
acquisition. 
 The culture of military strategy cannot and should not ignore the “ what if ” 
question. What if one day Iran, Iraq or even Israel decides to intimidate Turkey via their 
unconventional capabilities? What will Turkey do in a crisis escalation with a country 
possessing WMD? Most probably, there will not be a hot conflict, but it is most likely 
that the state, which lacks the countermeasures, will be deterred. Military analysts always 
bear in mind the concept of “worst-case analysis”, or to borrow from the Cold War 
terminology “window of vulnerability.” 
 The impetus of the procurement endeavors of the Middle Eastern states is 
manifestly high. The emerging arsenals of the states, which are detailed in the body text, 
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give reason to argue that Turkey confronts WMD threats coming from the Middle East. 
This threat, because it depends upon acquisition, increases gradually and becomes more 
perilous. 
Developments after the Iran-Iraq War, and particularly the Gulf War caused 
Turkey to include WMD and ballistic missiles in the hands of its neighbors in its threat 
assessment.302 In early 1999, a NATO assessment reinforced this evaluation that Turkey 
faces ballistic missile threats from Iran, Iraq and Syria. Noting that Turkey’s three largest 
cities-İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir- are now within the range of its neighbors’ ballistic 
missiles, the document recommended developing military and civilian response structures 
against these threats. And that is why Turkey is eager to acquire theatre missile defenses. 
Iranian Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) is capable of striking Turkey 
with a 700 kg. warhead. Iran is also continuing its development of the 1,000 kg. payload 
Shahab-4 missile that may be able to hit most parts of Europe, not to mention all of 
Turkey. Although Iran faces technical difficulties, one cannot expect them to last forever.  
 Syria, to the south of Turkey, deploys Scud-Bs and –Cs and SS-N-3b Sepal cruise 
missiles. It is working to load nerve agents onto Scud warheads and has chemical gravity 
bombs for delivery by its MiG-29 and Su-30 aircraft. During a 1998 crisis with Turkey, 
Syria redeployed 36 Scud-C short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) from its border with 
Israel to a position opposite the Turkish border. Unlike Iraq, Syria, and Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Israel does not constitute an imminent threat against Turkey. Turkish-Israeli 
rapprochement is strong, and a threat is much less likely from Israel when compared to 
other states studied. Still, because Turkey is within range of long-range ballistic missiles 
                                                 
302 Interview with the generals of the Turkish Air Forces who wished to remain anonymous. 
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of Israel and Saudi Arabia, examination of their capabilities must be included in this 
study.  
 Although Iraq’s al-Hussein, al-Abbas and Scuds are destroyed by UNSCOM 
inspectors, it still retains the necessary technological capability. What’s more, it is 
difficult to neglect the Iraqi attempts to resume its biological and chemical weapons 
development and delivery programs during the past two years. In 1999, Russian-made 
S300 (SA-10 Grumble in NATO designation) SAMs are intended to be delivered to 
southern Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot’s aim was to end Turkish air superiority over the 
island. Furthermore, S-300’s 150-kilogram conventional high-explosive fragmentation 
warhead with proximity fusing multiplied the threat posed. In 1997, Turkish military 
assessed that the S-300 could be modified to carry a nuclear, chemical or biological 
payload.303 It could be used in a surface-to-surface mission also, hitting the important 
Turkish Mediterranean port cities of Antalya and Mersin. After diplomatic negotiations 
and under a Turkish threat to destroy the missiles if they were deployed on Cyprus, the S-
300s were diverted to another Greek island, Crete. 
 Russian Federation has confirmed that it concluded the installation of S-300s in 
Armenia. Iran and Syria are reported to be very likely customers304. Consequently, 
Turkey confronts no little military threats, which must be addressed as soon as possible. 
The longer time passes, the bigger the threat becomes.  
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APPENDIX A
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CW
Chemical Weapons means the following together or separately: a) Toxic
chemicals and their precursors b) Munitions and devices c) Any equipment specifically
designed for use directly with munitions and devices.1 ‘Munitions and devices’ are
specifically designed to cause fatal harm or other harm through the toxic properties of
toxic chemicals that would be spread as a consequence of the use of such munitions and
devices. Toxic chemical means any chemical, which through its chemical action on life
processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
animals. Precursor means any chemical reactant, which takes part at any stage in the
production. Production of a chemical means its formation through chemical reaction.
Major chemical agents are of eight: the first type is nerve agents that quickly
disrupt the nervous system by binding to enzymes critical to nerve functions causing
convulsions and paralysis. They must be ingested, inhaled, or absorbed through the skin.
A reaction upon contact normally occurs in 1-2 minutes, but death may occur from lethal
doses within minutes. Recovery is normally quick if it occurs at all, but permanent brain
damage can occur. Main nerve agents are Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), Soman (GD), DF,
VR-55 (Improved Soman), VK/VX.2
Although Tabun is the first nerve agent, discovered in 1936, Sarin is more
infamous, and used by Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult that carried out chemical weapons
attack with it on the Tokyo Subway in March 1995. Sarin is almost as volatile as water
                                                
1 Text of the Chemical Weapons Convention, http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cw-cwc-texts.html
2 Anthony Cordesman and Ahmet S. Hashim, Iraq-Sanctions and Beyond, Colorado: Westview Press,
1997, pp. 295-305; Anthony Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions, Westport: Praeger, 1999, pp.444-
111
and delivered by air, and a respiratory dose of 100 mg/min/m3 is lethal and lethality lasts
1-2 days. VK/VX is another notorious agent, which is persistent and almost as heavy as
fuel oil, and its lethality lasts 1-16 weeks.
The second type of agents is blister agents. They can be colorless or black oily
droplets and absorbed through inhalation or skin contact. Blister agents penetrate
ordinary clothing. They are cell poisons that destroy skin and tissue, which may cause
blindness if contact occurs with the eyes. It causes serious internal damage if inhaled, and
can result in fatal respiratory damage. It takes hours to days, but its effect on the eyes are
much more rapid. Mustard gas is a typical blister agent and exposure to concentrations of
a few milligrams per meter over several hours generally at least causes blisters and
swollen eyes. If it touches the skin or eyes, it can cause second or third degree burns.3
It can blind and cause damage to the lungs leading to pneumonia. If exposed
severely, it may cause intoxication similar to radiation sickness. If one is short of
prevention of exposure, the only treatment is to wash the eyes, decontaminate the skin,
and treat the resulting damage like burns. Blister agents are sulfur mustard, (H or HD),
distilled mustard (DM), nitrogen mustard (HN), Lewisite (L), Phosgene Oxime (CX), and
mustard lewisite (HL). Mustard gas was used extensively during World War I, “the king
of battle gases” was then used on both sides in 1917, killed 91,000 and injured 1.2
million people.4
Third type is choking agents, agents that cause the blood vessels in the lungs to
hemorrhage until the victim chokes or drowns in his or her own fluids. Symptoms emerge
                                                                                                                                                
448; Anthony Cordesman, Iran-Dilemmas of Dual Containment, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp.382-
390.
3 Ibid.
4 Gert G. Harigel, op cit. p.2
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in seconds up to three hours. They can be absorbed through inhalation; Phosgene (CG),
Diphosgene (DP), PS Chloropicrin, Chlorine Gas.
Blood agents kill through inhalation. Little warning is possible for them except
for headache, nausea, and vertigo. Because these agents interfere with use of oxygen at
the cellular level, rapid exposure may kill by inhibiting cell respiration. What is crucial is
that passive defense measures such as gas masks are not protective enough against blood
agents, namely, hydrogen cyanide (AC) and Cyanogen Chloride (CK).
Fifth category includes toxins. These are biological poisons causing
neuromuscular paralysis after exposure of hours or days. They are formed in cultures of
the bacterium clostridium botulimun. Botulin toxin (A) has six distinct types of which
four are fatal to human beings. All new generation of chemical weapons are referred to as
developmental weapons of which only publicized one is perfluoroisobutene (PFIB),
which is an extremely toxic odorless and invisible substance produced when PFIB
(Teflon) is subjected to extreme heat under special conditions. For this kind of new
weapons, no technical literature is available, and no protective equipment offers defense.
Control agents are agents that produce temporary irritation or disabling effects
when inhaled or in contact with the eyes. Chlororacetophenone (CN) and O-
Chlorobenzyl-malononitrile (CS) cause flow of tears, nausea and vomiting. Adamsite
(DM) and staphylococcus cause irritation, coughing, severe headache, and tightness in
chest, nausea and vomiting.
The last agent category is the ones that incapacitate people through causing short-
term illnesses, psychoactive effects (delirium and hallucinations). They can be absorbed
by means of inhalation or skin contact. The psychoactive gases and drugs produce
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unpredictable effects, particularly in the sick, small children, elderly and individuals who
already are mentally ill. They seldom kill; however, they may cause a permanent
psychotic condition. The lethal dose is 100 to 200 milligrams. They are BZ-, LSD-, LSD-
based BZ, Mescaline, Psilocyloin Benzilates.
Whereas protection with various degrees of efficiency is possible against
chemical and biological weapons (CBW), it is not the case for defense against nuclear
weapons. However, inconvenient it may be for military forces on the battlefield for
maneuvering and attacking, still there are passive defenses such as gas masks, protective
clothing and vaccination. CBW is different from nuclear weapons in terms of their
delivery or transportation that is discussed in detail above. Furthermore, only BW can be
comparable to nuclear weapons in the lethality rate only when special conditions needed
for biological agents’ survival and dispersal are met. Only nuclear weapons are
completely indiscriminate by their explosive power, heat, blast radiation, and
radioactivity.
HISTORY OF CHEMICAL WARFARE
The Greeks first used sulfur mixtures with pitch resin to produce suffocating
fumes in 431 B.C during the Trojan War. Attempts to control them date back to ancient
Greece again, and Romans. Around 500 B.C the Manu Law of War in India banned their
use. By 500 A.D. Saracens prohibited them through their regulations on the conduct of
war drawn from the Koran. In 1675, a Franco-German accord was signed in Strasburg.
Then, in 1874, the Brussels Convention was signed in order to prohibit the use of poison
or poisoned weapons. As for more recent era, the Regulation on Land Warfare included
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articles outlawing poison.5 This regulation was annexed to the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907.
Nevertheless, all belligerents in WWI used chemical weapons extensively.
Prohibitions were largely ignored. The year 1922 saw the establishment of the
Washington Treaty as a sign of the recognition of the inhuman aspect and suffering
involved in chemical weapons use in the Great War. The signatories were the United
States, Japan, France, Italy and Britain. And finally, World War I also paved the way for
the adoption of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous and other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, also known as the
1925 Geneva Protocol. It is now nearly universal as a ban on the use of CW. Still, the
Geneva Protocol did neither proscribe the stockpiling or the research on chemical
weapons.
In spite of the conventions and treaties proscribing CW, Italians used them during
the war of 1935 – 1936 in Ethiopia. Japanese used them in China during World War II
between 1938 and 1942, and in Yemen from 1966 to 1967. Various chemicals agents
were researched and developed so as to be weaponized against the enemy perceived.6
The Ottoman Empire at its late times, and the European colonial powers allegedly
introduced CW to the Middle East. British forces reported in as early as 1916 on Turkish
deployment of German-supplied CW in Baghdad.
British forces used them widely against Shias, a revolt in 1920. They employed
gas in Palestine during the Battle of Gaza and in Baghdad. Spanish forces also used it in
                                                
5 Peter Herby op cit pp.9-13; Panofsky op cit. p.7; Trevor Findlay, Chemical Weapons and Missile
Proliferation, London: Lynne Rienner, 1991, pp. 24-31
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Morocco during 1923 to 1927, Italians in Libya in 1930 and Ethiopia in 1935-40. Britons
transported large stockpiles to the Middle East during World War II, and abandoned
British stocks are cited as the source of CW used by Egypt in the Yemen civil war.
In the second half of the 20th century, interest in CW in the region accelerated
owing to the Arab-Israeli wars. The period following the wars of 1967 and 1973 provided
the region with a robust stimulus for developing CW. What’s more, with the awareness of
Israel’s absolute weapon capability, early 1970s entailed retaliatory forces against a
possible nuclear weapon use by Israel. Allegations of Egyptian CW use in Yemen depend
upon sources of Western journalists, royalist sources opposing the Egyptian
interventions, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).7 Alleged use
focuses on three periods 1963, 1965 and 1967. Egypt always denied resort to CW in the
Yemen War. International reaction to reports of alleged Egyptian CW use was weak, and
the US response was muted, because of its own use of weaponized chemical agents. The
US used herbicides and harassing agents in Vietnam. It used lachrymatory agents and
heavy doses of defoliants. Vietnam experienced also napalm that is considered by some
international organizations to be a chemical weapon.
 Napalm is a substance to mask CW. Chemical weapons may be masked as
defoliants. Between 1962 and 1971, more than 72 million liter herbicides were dispersed
over South Vietnam of which more than 44 million liters were the defoliant agent orange
containing 170 kg. dioxin. American scientists managed thickening gasoline into sticky
syrup that burns more slowly but at a higher temperature than gasoline. This mixture is
used in a high explosive charge to be scattered in the form of a flaming liquid, which
                                                                                                                                                
6 Ibid.
7 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat
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sticks to what it hits until burned out. This mixture is knows as Napalm, and can be used
in aircraft or missile-delivered warheads against military or civilian targets. Although it is
largely not regarded as a CW, it should be considered so since it was used largely and
widely in Vietnam.
The Yemeni experience and the US use in Vietnam were the main stimulus for
heightened interest in CW capabilities. Syria urged for Egyptian support in developing its
own CW program right after the conflict in Yemen ceased. In the late 1960s, Iraq began
its own CW program demonstrating a keen interest in the Egyptian case, and around this
time Israel is said to have begun working on its offensive program.8
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL OR
RADIOLOGICAL EVENT
Chemical, biological, and radiological materials as well as industrial agents can
be dispersed in the air we breathe, the water we drink, or on surfaces we physically
contact. Dispersion methods may be as simple as placing a container in a heavily used
area, opening a container, using conventional spray devices that are used in agriculture,
or as elaborate as detonating an explosive device through aircraft or missiles. Chemical
events are characterized by the rapid onset of medical symptoms (minutes to hours) and
easily observed signatures such as dead foliage, pungent odor, and dead insect or animals.
In the case of a biological event, the symptoms require days to weeks and there will not
be any characteristic signatures. Because of the delayed onset of symptoms due to
different incubation periods lasting for different agents and possible use of infectious
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agents, the area affected may be greater when infected individuals migrate. In the case of
a radiological incident, the onset of symptoms requires days to weeks, as is the case for
biological weapons. There will be no signatures indicating a radiological attack.
Radiological materials are not recognizable by the senses, and are colorless and odorless.
RW may present high level of radioactivity creating an immediate or long-term health
hazard in a wide area due to traveling contaminated individuals.    9
Public appreciation of the term ‘biological weapons’ is non-existent or little at
best. When there is some comprehension of chemical agents due to their use in the First
World War, unforgettable images of incapacitated troops in that war, alongside with the
use by Iraq against Iran and against its own Kurdish citizens in the mid-1980s, there is no
such general appreciation of biological weapons or warfare. They are envisioned as
uncontrolled epidemics harming both aggressor and attacked. This is by no means the
case. If protection measures (immunization of the body by vaccination or usage of
respirators) are taken, then the agent will only affect the target population, not the
attacker. Another point is that there are non-transmissible agents which are suitable for
point-or region-strike, Not only selection of transmissible or non-transmissible agents is
available, but by selection of the biological agent used, the outcome (incapacitation or
death ) can be manipulated as well. What are biological weapons, how do they differ
from chemical weapons? The answer lies in their mechanism or mode of action.10
The scientific division between chemical and biological weapons is that chemical
                                                                                                                                                
8 Peter Herby, op cit. p.22; Jonathan B. Tucker and Kathleen M. Vogel, “Preventing the Proliferation of
Chemical and Biological Weapon Materials and Know-How “Special Report, The Non-proliferation
Review, Spring 2000, pp. 90-95
9 Chemical/Biological/Radiological Incident Handbook, October 1998, www.fas.org/irp/threat
10 Graham S. Pearson, “Their Nature and Arms Control”, in Efraim Karsh (ed.), Non-Conventional
Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press 1993, pp. 102-103
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weapons are non-living substances (left-hand four boxes), which poison the target
population, while biological weapons are living micro-organisms (right-hand two boxes),
which infect the target community. The killing mechanism of a biological weapon is
disease. Human beings have yet to experience the full destructive power of these
detestable weapons, for there have been only a few instances of biological weapons
attacks, with the most rudimentary types of it.11 The target of biowarfare may be humans,
animals or plants whereas CWs applicability to plants is controversial. As to the route of
primary attack of the target by BW, it is of four: In halation, ingestion of contaminated
food and water, contamination of an open wound with bacterial warfare agent, and insect
vectors. Inhalation is the main way of attack of human beings; other three are rather
inefficient methods of warfare. As for the transmissibility, most of the traditional
biowarfare agents are non-transmissible, hence will not cause an epidemic. However, if a
transmissible agent is opted, then the disease can be transmitted from those exposed to
the attack to those not exposed.12
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Historically, BC 190 saw Hannibal winning a naval victory by firing vessels full
of venomous snakes into the ships of the enemy. Thus, biological warfare is far older
than the scientific understanding of germs and diseases. The Greeks, Persians and
Romans poisoned wells with animal corpses. In 1346, an outbreak of plague in central
Asia reached the Tartars besieging the port of Caffa (now Feodosia) in Crimea. The
Tartars abandoned the siege, but they catapulted the bodies of their dead over the walls.
                                                
11 Ibid, p.101
12 Douglas Holdstock, “Biotechnology and Biological Warfare”, Peace Review, 12:4 2000, pp.549-553.
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Some Genoese traders fled home, taking the disease with them. In the next few years the
Black Death spread throughout Western Europe. This episode stressed that biowarfare
agents are indiscriminate, and do not always distinguish friend from foe. But as medical
knowledge grew, it was concluded that when an infectious disease is endemic in a
society, some degree of natural immunity develops, whereas the same disease can
produce disastrous epidemics in non-immune populations. This insight was used by
British troops in 1763, with the deliberate spread of smallpox to American Indians in Fort
Pitt, Ohio by giving them infected blankets.13 Napoleon in his Italian Campaign
attempted to infect the inhabitants of Manchua, which he besieged with swamp fever. In
World War I, Germans and France used germ warfare against animals, against cattle (in
the German case as part of their economic blockade of Europe) and horses (cavalry were
still a vital part of the military forces during the era) rather than humans. The germs used
were anthrax (mainly a disease of cattle) and glanders (of horses), and the German
program extended to the use of these agents in Argentina and the eastern United States to
block prospective exports to UK and France. Because it is much more stable (existing as
a yellow powder) and therefore more easily transported than most germs which have to
be transported in liquid form, anthrax was used frequently, and is still the top-priority
concern for many of the defense analysts.
The 1925 Geneva Protocol proscribed the use of bacteriological agents in warfare,
but not research into their potentialities, and many countries continued research
                                                
13 Ibid, pp.549-551, and Peter Hadfield, “Lethal Legacy” in New Scientist, Vol. 169, Issue 2276,
02/03/2001, p.5
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programs. In particular, the activity of Unit 731 in Japan is a significant mention of
biowarfare.
Japan was among the countries continuing research on BW, and the result was a
odious episode. Japan made horrific experiments between 1932 and 1945 and researchers
tested the effects of various candidate biowarfare agents, a wide range of bacteria.14
These resulted in thousands of deaths mainly in Manchuria.15 The victims included
criminals and Chinese prisoners of war. The tests were extended to field trials, and
attempts at weaponisation perhaps with actual use. There are also allegations of use of
bacteriological warfare by Japan against China in the 1930s.16 Survivor experimental
subjects were usually murdered afterwards. After 1945, some of the perpetrators of these
atrocities were punished as war criminals in the Soviet Union. Others were given
immunity from prosecution by the USA in return for details of their studies.17 This is a
remarkable reminder of the lengths some desire to obtain information of possible military
utility. In contrast to that, very little work was done during World War II in Germany due
to the abhorrence of Hitler himself for the subject. This was not understood in U.K.,
where there was an active extensive program. The results of it were shared with the US
and Canada after 1942.
Another landmark was the use of Gruinard Island in 1942-3 to carry out trials to
determine whether an anti-personnel anthrax bomb would succeed, whether anthrax
spores could be disseminated from bombs and such spores borne downwind would infect
a flock of sheep. The experiments shaved that this could be done and the Scottish Island
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of Gruinard remained uninhabitable and a prohibited place for almost 50 years. It
returned to its owners only in 1990.18
Claims have been made that U.S. used agents such as yellow fever, and its vector
mosquito, anthrax, other animal diseases, brucellosis (undulant fever, normally affecting
cattle, sheep and pigs ), psittacosis ( parrot fever ) and tularemia ( a highly infectious
agent of rodents ) during the Korean War. This program was eventually ended in 1975.
Biological studies in the Soviet Union after World War II was stimulated by
realization of the possible military potentialities of BW shown by the Japanese activities,
and it did not end despite entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention  (BTWC). The next milestone in the story of biological warfare comes with
the outbreak of anthrax in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg). The Soviet
program was based on Sverdlovsk and elsewhere, the agents studied included anthrax,
plague, and several viruses among them smallpox and a variety of encephalitis. In 1992,
President Yeltsin ended the offensive program and ordered that it should be converted to
civilian use. He admitted that the anthrax outbreak in 1979 at Sverdlovsk, a scribed in the
past to contaminated meat, in fact originated in the BW facility. Although only a few
milligrams of spores escaped, nearly 70 people died. The facility may have been the first
in the world to apply biotechnology to a biological weapons program.19
The other country to continue an extensive program, despite being a party to
BTWC, is Iraq. The extent of their program came to light when UN inspectors started
their task of implementing a settlement after the second Gulf War. They found a variety
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of agents, some in weapons-usable form (weaponized), for example in Scud missiles.
These included botulism toxin, the fungus product aflatoxin that causes liver cancer, and
anthrax and gas gangrene germs.20
Some of the materials and the original strains of the organisms were supplied
from the U.K. and U.S. at the time of the Iran-Iraq war when Iran was at loggerheads
with the States. Now, lack of evidence as to whether they still have some BW and other
types of WMD is the stated reason for maintaining economic sanctions against Iraq,
modified as of June 2001 and nuanced as ‘smart sanctions’.
ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVES
The abhorrence against CW led to Geneva Protocol of 1925 that prohibited the
use of CW and was extended to include a ban on the use of bacteriological/biological
weapons. The Protocol following the First World War bans the use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. It
makes no provision for inspection or verification of allegations of use. Despite the fact
that bacteriological weapons were included in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, a more
comprehensive treaty to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of BW and
toxin weapons and their destruction was signed in London, Moscow, and Washington on
10 April 1972, referred to as BTWC.21 Although above prohibitions of developing,
producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining such agents are made, there is
                                                
20 Anthony H. Cordesman, WMD in Iraq, Center of Strategic and International Studies (Online Database),
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no prohibition of possession of a production capability. Thus when possession of BW
would be a breach of the BTWC, the possession of dual-purpose weapons, equipment or
means of delivery would not. This is the hardship confronting arms control endeavors.
Another crucially important point is that there are no provisions for intrusive inspections
and monitoring of compliance.
A point of confusion occurs when BTWC is examined, it addresses to biological
agents and toxins, but neither of them is defined in the treaty. Still, it is obvious that the
term biological agents apply only to the microbial organisms that are living and are able
to replicate themselves. The toxins, although the natural products of microbial organisms
or plants, are non-living and are strictly chemicals. Another term not defined in the
BTWC is ‘agents of biological origin’. It can cover ant material that can be produced by
biological systems, and comprises non-living chemicals and living micro-organisms.
One of the characteristics of biowarfare is its subtlety. Many of the related
allegations are unsubstantiated or unproven. Its use does not always produce a clear sign.
This is especially the case if the selected agent causes a disease that is endemic in the
country whose population is being attacked. This is why it is enigmatic to figure out
whether endemics are results of natural outbreaks or intended use of bacteria.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND DELIVERY MEANS
The main classes of biological warfare agents are:
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Bacteria: These are causative micro-organisms that produce diseases such as
anthrax, plague, and tularemia. They can be readily grown in artificial media using
facilities akin to those in the brewery industry.
Viruses: These are the smallest forms of life and must be grown in living tissue,
like Venezuelan equine encephalitis.
Rickettsia: It is the intermediate between viruses and bacteria, which also must be
grown in living tissue, like the organism producing Q-Fever.
Fungi: A sample is coccidioidomycosis; few species appear to have biowarfare
potential as the growth of fungus aspergilus causing aflatoxin.
Toxins: These are the non-living products of microorganisms such as botulinium
toxin or staphylococcal enterotoxin B, of plants such as ricin from castor beans or of
living creatures such as saxitoxin from shellfish.22
Biological-warfare agents vary considerably both in the quantity needed to
produce disease or to intoxicate people, and in the nature of the effect-to incapacitate or
kill. Biowarfare agents have delayed onset of symbols, twelve hours or more for toxins,
and a few days or more for microbial agents. This delay is the basic difference between
biological and chemical warfare; the latter is faster acting with nerve agents and
hydrogen cyanide producing effects in minutes. Nevertheless, some chemical warfare
agents such as mustard and phosgene take several hours to produce symptoms:
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The choice of a biological agent involves consideration of a large number of
factors such as the infective dose, the time to effect, and whether the agent produces a
transmissible disease, as well as the method of attack of the target community (inhalation,
ingestion or an insect vector), the means of dispersion or delivery of the agent, the
stability of the agent, and the practicality of achieving an infective dose at the target
personnel.23
As for the delivery means, the first is infecting animals and through them the
disease can be spread. Secondly, producing aerosols of the particle size suitable to enter
the human respiratory system and lungs. Third, missile warheads are used as a
transporting vehicle, through fractionating the payload. The advantages of biological
warfare include potency (small quantities are necessary); lack of sign, if an endemic
disease agent is chosen; the ease of covert production using dual-purpose facilities; lack
of risk to one’s own forces; if a non-transmissible agent is selected; and finally large-
scale or strategic, small-scale/tactical use, or covert/terrorist use. Disadvantages of them
are the fragility/weaknesses of microorganisms in the atmosphere limiting their
effectiveness; limited or no effectiveness if prevailing weather conditions are
unfavorable; the difficulties and perils of keeping and handling BW agents and the
uncertainty of effectiveness, as there is no proven prior use of them in war.24
A momentous development changing all those biowarfare processes and nature of
the agents took place with the modern biotechnology. The first application of modern
biotechnology to biowarfare was the Sverdlovsk program. According to one of the
                                                                                                                                                
22 Graham S. Pearson, op cit. p. 110
23 Richard Falkenrath, “Weapons of Mass Reaction”, Harvard International Review, Summer 2000, p.54
and Al J. Venter, “Iraq’s Biological Weapons”, Middle East Policy, Vol. VI. No.4, June 1999, p.109.
24 Ibid.
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defectors of the program, the plague organism Yersinia pestis, infections with which are
curable when due treatment is applied, was genetically engineered to make it resistant to
standard antibiotics. If it were used as a bacteriological weapon, its lethality would
increase in gross, making the standard antibiotic treatment ineffective. Even if laboratory
testings found an alternative antibiotic, the lethality of plague would be so high that very
many people would die before treatment could be started.25
Currently biological weapons (BW) are feared more as terror weapons against
civilians rather than battlefield weapons, but if troops were not immune this balance
would change.26 Several other techniques in biotechnology now or within a few years’
time could make biowarfare more of a threat. Harmless bacteria, such as soil organisms,
become causes of new diseases if bioengineered with genes from pathogenic germs.
Apart from the above near-future possibilities, familiar disease-causing germs could be
genetically modified to make them difficult to identify. Their stability in the atmosphere
or in the environment could be enhanced, making organisms currently not usable as
weapons more usable, Bacteriological weapons has also a unique feature making it even
more of a characteristic tool to be weaponized; They can be used to attack plants, crops
which could cause famine if the country concerned is dependent on a particular crop.27
A longer-term sinister possibility is the weapons targeted against specific ethnic
groups, namely genetic weapons. Since the first draft of the human genome has been
announced, it is being argued that as the details are filled in, and the identity of genes are
found, the small but determining differences between ethnic groups will emerge. With
                                                
25 Wendy Barnaby, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare, London: Vision, 1999,
pp.  62-67.
26 Douglas Holdstock, op cit. p. 551
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this information at hand, it will be clearer whether it is possible to design biological
warfare agents.
-Toxins, viruses or bacteria-more harmful to one ethnic group. This is not an
immediate threat, but still it renders a ‘what if’ question.28
In its June 2000 report, Overcoming Antimicrobial Resistance, the World Health
Organization warned that the level of resistance to antibiotics of common germs is about
to reach crisis point. AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and prieumonia will become very hard
and mote dangerous to treat. Understanding antibiotic resistance and developing new
antibiotics as well as treatment of some diseases like cancer or an inherited disorder as
cystic fibrosis depend upon biotechnology. Gene theraphy that is used during treatments
could be misused to disguise viruses. At present only a handful of developed Western
countries have the facilities to apply biotechnology to biological war, but many other
countries will follow them in the next 15 years or so.29
                                                                                                                                                
27 Leonard A. Cole, The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical. New York: Freeman,
1997, pp.105-110.
28 The Royal Society, Measures for Controlling the Threat from Biological Weapons, London: Royal
Society, 2000, p.72.
29 Major Gary Brown, “America’s Struggle with Chemical and Biological Warfare (Book Review)”, in Air
Power History, Vol. 48, Issue 1, Spring 2001, p.2.
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APPENDIX B
Syria’s Interest in Biological Weapons: Article written by Syrian Defense Minister
Gen. Mustafa Tlas, “Biological Warfare, A New and Effective Method in Modern
Warfare”
FBIS Translated Text: IAP20000501000119 Tehran SAFF in Persian 04/25/2000 pp 38-
42 [Article translated by First Lieutenant Mohammad Motahhari, Published in SAFF
Issue No.235 [22 Nov-21 Dec 99].], [FBIS Translated Text]
1. The Concept of Biological (Germ) Warfare.
Biological warfare means intentional military action and use of toxic material against
living creatures to annihilate the enemy and to inflict damage to subsistence or
agricultural resources, in order ultimately to weaken the enemy’s fighting power. A
number of experts have called this kind of warfare Bacteriological, Germ and Biological,
but here we have borrowed the concept of biological warfare from the biology term and
will use it as such. Biological warfare is the first and the most primitive war that Mother
Nature has staged against human beings; at the end of this century, the fight between
them still continues in the most severe way. Though man has been able to control and
overcome diseases such as plague, smallpox, cholera, typhus, and dysentery, still many
diseases and toxins destroy millions of people every year weather in war or peace. If we
note that Nazi Germany under the leadership of Hitler—who didn’t care about
international organizations and regulations—didn’t use such weapons in critical and
difficult moments in World War II and didn’t resort to such wars, it was merely because
first, he was frightened that the opposing forces might have reacted similarly; second, he
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wasn’t sure whether he would be able to cope with the consequences and control it.
Generally speaking, in the history of war, resorting to biological warfare required that the
violating party not be frightened of a similar reaction from the opposite party, and that
biological and disease agents not be used against him in return. This was the case when a
biological weapon was used in Japan’s war against China before World War II, and also
when the Americans used the same weapon in the Korean War. In continuing this
iscussion we will see how the United Nations banned this weapon and why most
countries accepted the sanction.
2. Biological Weapon.
A biological weapon consists of all elements and biological components along with the
necessary tools to use them, knowing that these materials are merely the kind that harm
and hurt human beings, animals, and plants. From the military point of view, biological
weapons are divided into different groups: A. Germs [or microbes]. These are very tiny
creatures that have neither smell nor color and could be kept alive in the outside
environment. These germs play their role as follows:
• Bacteria: These are microscopic creatures that have a vegetation and botanical origin;
This is the basic material that causes diseases such as cholera and typhoid for human
beings, a kind of plague for animals and birds, and a kind of Siberian smallpox harmful to
human beings and animals.
• Viruses: These are creatures that are a hundred thousand times smaller than bacteria
and cause typhoid fever, yellow smallpox, and so forth.
130
• Rickettsia [the Persian/Arabic term used is riketziyat]: They are intermediate segments
and related to the two previous kinds. Their prevalence causes diseases such as smallpox
and so forth and could be carried by many agents among them insects.
• Fungi [the Persian/Arabic term used is fotriyat]: These creatures are of a botanical
origin and have more complicated structure than bacteria. They are found individually
and in a group. These creatures can cause diseases such as Histoplavis [as published,
possibly referring to Histoplasmosis].
B. Toxins [or poisons]. Toxins consist of those materials that have a high degree of
poison and can disseminate germs, which, after they are dried up, can be kept for
several weeks. Poisons cause various diseases. To develop poisons, it is necessary to
observe a certain period of time, not less than two hours.
C. Potassium Toxins [as published]. Potassium poison is one of the strongest poisons; the
percentage of its active toxin is at least tens of thousands of times (Footnote 1: 432 grams
of this material is enough to destroy the entire population of the world). Potassium poison
is capable of inflicting serious damage to the central nervous system as well as optical
and circulatory systems; it can even destroy these systems and cause death.
 D.Ontagious Carrier Creatures. Among these creatures, insects such as ticks, blood-
sucking insects, and lice could be named. E. Harmful Insects and Plants. Many harmful
insects and some plants are available that could be used against the enemy in order to
inflict harm on enemy forces. Yet there are means and tools that can be employed for
biological warfare, and among them we refer to the following:
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• Bombs: For instance, an American-made bomb called the “M-114” is capable of
carrying 320 cubic centimeters of a biological liquid. Another kind, the “M-32”, is
capable ofcarrying 108 times more than the “M-114,” almost about 35 kg.
• Mortar and tank ordnance is among other tools to carry such materials.
• Airplane bomber systems (bomb launchers) frequently contain some liquid material and
or a large quantity of harmful insects.
• Sounds, boxes and containers that are thrown out of airplanes [as published].
• Direct contamination of water and food resources by penetration and mercenaries.
3. Methods of Exploitation, Range, and Effectiveness.
Biological agents and materials are used in two ways:
• Wind-borne dissemination of these materials toward the desired target in order to
contaminate a vast area. This method is among the most effective ways and is used
widely.
• Direct dissemination of these materials over the desired target by airplane. This method
on one hand has more precision but inevitably more materials must be used to
contaminate avast area.
Other methods include contaminating water and food resources. This is a serious danger,
because first, it is done clandestinely and individuals are not aware of it; second, using
this method will result in many more casualties. Of course this can be done when the
enemy has no sanitation control over water and food resources. Obviously in this case the
existence of chemical and biological agents will be revealed easily by the enemy.
Likewise, insects are also scattered in war zones. These insects are harmful to human
beings, animals, and plants, and will cause various respiratory and in particular skin
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diseases. Of course, the existence of these insects in war zones is usually discovered
immediately, because it is not normal to see insects in high numbers in war zones. As for
when biological weapons should be used, it must be said that at night or early in the
morning is better. At this time of the day, wind speed reaches 2 to 4 meters per second,
the temperature does not exceed 10 degrees Centigrade, and there is no rain either. The
range and infliction of biological bombs in comparison with chemical and nuclear
weapons are different and could be cited as follows:
• The range of infliction of bombs by bombers (airplanes) carrying toxic chemical
material is about 60 sq. km and this area is covering the region in which the biological
materials are disseminated.
• This area for the airplane itself which is carrying an atomic bomb weighing up to 100
kilo ton [as published], is up to 100 to 1000 sq. km.
• Yet, the infliction range of the biological material reaches up to 2000 sq. km.
In reference to how long the effects will continue, it must be said that the effects are not
less than two days. It must be noted at the same time that lice, which sometimes can be
used to harm the enemy, can survive for a year.
4. Prevention Against Biological Agents.
What we mean by prevention is to prevent the exposure of individuals to these agents and
materials. But if an individual comes down with an illness, inevitably he must seek
medical treatment as with ordinary illnesses. For this reason, individuals use various tools
and equipment to avoid such exposure, such as use of a mask.
To prevent contact with harmful insects and animals and so forth group-oriented
equipment such as shelters and dormitories equipped with special air-filtration and
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ventilation may be used. In addition, vaccination is widely used nowadays, in which one
vaccine can prevent disease and provide immunity for up to 10 to 15 people. Also, group
vaccinations, which are disseminated in the air, could be used. These kinds of vaccines
provide coverage to more individuals and decrease the percentage of those infected with
disease. Therefore, inevitably there must be severe control in health and medical systems,
whether it is in reference to safeguarding the water resources or to place the food items in
secured places, for example by placing them in secured and tight containers. If
individuals become contaminated, they should take measures to clean the contamination
and change their clothing. Luckily, most items used for cleaning off toxic materials can
be used for biological contamination as well. The list of contamination cleaning materials
includes chlorine compounds, oxidation materials, phenol, furmalin [as published] and so
forth. Discovering the existence of biological materials and contamination resulting from
these materials is accomplished with the use of special tools able to recognize tiny
particles in the air—of course, they are not able to establish the nature of these materials.
Yet, to run a laboratory test we must have a sample of the biological agents.
5. Usage and Application of a Biological Weapon in War
A biological weapon is used on specific targets on enemy soil or it is used to remove
some tactical problems in the battlefield. In both cases (use in the battlefield and or on
enemy soil), weather a nuclear weapon is used or not, it is necessary to learn from the
experiences. Also when using this weapon we must be aware of the consequences and
potential problems it may cause. To use these kinds of weapons many issues must be
considered. If the price and value of the launching and firing tool and also the price of the
bomb itself which is fired toward a specific target is more than the predicted damage
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inflicted on the enemy by using this weapon, it is not wise to take such action. (Otherwise
it is “wise? “- Yael)
Former commander of the US armed forces Gen. Estabis [as transliterated] believes that
current biological equipment could resolve many strategic problems and could target all
facilities and installations of an area of one continent!! Therefore, it is necessary to use
biological agents that are able to live a long time in order to provide the opportunity to
form contaminated clouds over the desired region. If we assume that the biological and
disease-bearing material remains for a complete day and night and for the early morning
hours, or approximately for 15 hours; and also that wind speed is about 40 km per hour,
in that case the toxic cloud formed will cover more than 600 km. Yet for assurance it is
necessary that the bombing continue until all of the clouds and toxic dust created by it
covers the entire desired area. Also, the distance between each contaminated cloud should
not be more than 600 km. Whenever a nuclear weapon is used by a country that possesses
this kind Of weapon against another country that [also] possesses nuclear weapons,
inevitably the fire of nuclear war will be inflamed and will be followed by a reaction and
similar confrontation by the violated country and or its allies. Such a country has at a
minimum entered into a nuclear by-way from which withdrawal will be very difficult.
But if, on the other hand, a biological weapon were used instead of a nuclear weapon,
there would not be any of the above consequences. In this case (use of a biological
weapon), not only will the violated country not be able to discover the effects of infliction
immediately, but also, international public opinion will not believe the claim of the
violated country regarding the use of this weapon. Such a country also will have a hard
time attracting the attention of world public opinion and international organizations.
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Also, it is rarely seen that the violated country takes action against the aggressor by using
a nuclear weapon. But the most dangerous thing that can happen is the lack of control of
the biological weapon after its use. It is possible that the following day the wind direction
will change and bring back all of the material to the aggressor country. Another point of
view believes that if a country possesses biological weapons, it will never use them until
it has the equipment and the tools to neutralize and control the consequences. The issue
of “Greenyard” island, which is located northwest of Scotland, still is remembered.
During World War II, when British scientists were conducting their tests and created the
anthrax virus, it was realized that this germ would contaminate this island up until 1966,
and it is still believed that the contamination will continue for another 100 years. It is
basically possible to employ carrier vectors for diseases, but the possibility of
contaminating individuals is rare; therefore, they are not among the most leading tools of
biological warfare. There is a fear that if a disease is transferred to insects and other
animals, the balance in nature may change and may have grave and irreparable
consequences. Considering all these issues, it is necessary to pay attention in using such
biological materials, namely: considering land conditions, climatic conditions, the
lifetime of biological disease-bearing agents, and the effect of contaminated clouds on
agricultural and fertile lands. In addition, the following appear necessary for study:
• Reinforcement and consolidation of existing forces in the targeted region and knowing
whether or not there are any living creatures and also their nature. One must note whether
there are only military individuals in the region, or civilians as well;
• The distance between the target and the forces, facilities, and installations of friendly
countries, allies, and neutral countries;
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• The duration of effects of the biological weapon;
• The essence of the objective pursued and its importance—to determine whether it is
necessary to occupy the targeted area, or retreat from it, or just pass it by.
If military and civilian individuals live in the targeted region, a kind of biological weapon
that has limited destructive impact must be used. But if there are only military individuals
in that region, a biological weapon that has a strong destructive power must be used. An
equipped army that takes part in contemporary war must have an area 300 km deep at its
disposal and accommodate itself in it, and it must not forget that at any given time the
enemy’s forces and groups may attack it. To recognize and identify the location and the
situation of these groups, which will be scattered in a vast area, will be difficult.
Justifying the use of biological weapons over a very far-reaching area or in wind blowing
in the direction of fertile agricultural lands also is very difficult, because such action may
cause a very severe reaction from the other side and or destruction of the enemy’s
fighting power in a way that will not realize even the direction of the infliction. In
reference to biological agents and disease-bearers, one must note the “Rabbit” germ,
which destroys human beings and living creatures. Humans have no immunity [to it] and
it can be transferred to the enemy in a very short time. (Nb: recent isolated outbreaks of
the Rabbit germ -Yael) This kind of weapon acts in such a way that until it reaches the
area of dissemination, the enemy is not aware of its existence. Usually, tactical or
operational missiles (with a range of several hundred kilometers) fire them. Likewise,
potassium poisons are used when the objective is to have an immediate impact on the
enemy. In a targeted region where civilians live, normally a non-lethal biological weapon
is used, such as mountain smallpox virus in which the casualties are fewer and non-
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contagious. Sometimes a type of biological weapon is used which is very difficult to treat
and cure those who have been exposed to it. There are 32 different types of agents and
biological weapons that are used in warfare. Another 160 exist but are inactive and have
not been used yet. Yet there are many types that are more active and are considered
military secrets and have not been disclosed by the countries that have discovered them.
The objective of every war is to destroy the enemy’s military forces and to damage the
economic system of that country in a way that paralyzes its fighting forces’ support
system. Biological weapons are used to destroy agricultural targets and particularly the
enemy’s food resources. Destruction of the enemy’s agricultural resources and livestock
weakens the industries and production of milk, cheese, dairy products, hide, wool,
medical first aid, cotton, tobacco, and tea, and other resources will decrease. It must be
mentioned that the grains (wheat and rice, which are among the most important food
items) make up 75 percent of the world’s food items. Therefore, biological agents as a
tool and weapon capable of being reproduced and distributed over a vast area of
agricultural lands and which will cause many people to become ill are used. Another kind
of biological material called Fungi [fotriyat] immediately upon attacking the target,
spontaneously split and break up and are disseminated over a vast area. These materials,
among the disease-bearing and biological agents, play a considerable role in destroying
plants and agricultural fields, and destroy wheat, rice, and potatoes. These agents, which
are normally in a dense and compressed form (footnote 2: These are biological and
disease-bearing agents that form a very hard layer around themselves and can live and
reproduce even in very unsuitable conditions), are conveyed over long distances by wind,
and contaminate a vast area; for a short time they will remain in the primary region just to
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be transferred to other places, then be relocated again and again to other places. Rain,
natural waters, insects, animals, as well as human beings could be the transfer vectors.
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